Republic Days in the post 1997 period Turkey : commemorative activities as embodied and contested interventions to the imaginary terrain of the 'nation' by Zencirci, F. Gizem
REPUBLIC DAYS IN THE POST 1997 PERIOD TURKEY: COMMEMORATIVE
ACTIVITIES AS EMBODIED AND CONTESTED INTERVENTIONS TO THE
IMAGINARY TERRAIN OF THE ‘NATION’
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University
by
F. GİZEM ZENCİRCİ
In Partial Fulfillment of  the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
SEPTEMBER 2004
ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science.
-------------------------------------
          Assist. Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu
          Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science.
-------------------------------------
          Assist. Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar
          Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science.
-------------------------------------
          Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç
          Examining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences.
-------------------------------------
          Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
          Director
iii
ABSTRACT
REPUBLIC DAYS IN THE POST 1997 PERIOD TURKEY: COMMEMORATIVE
ACTIVITIES AS EMBODIED AND CONTESTED INTERVENTIONS TO THE
IMAGINARY TERRAIN OF THE ‘NATION’
F. Gizem Zencirci
M.A., Department of Political Science
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu
 September 2004
This thesis explores the Republic Day holiday celebrations and their representations
in three newspapers; Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet in the post-1997 period from
a perspective which argues that commemorative activities are a point onto which
interventions signify both embodiment and contestation for the ‘national imaginary’.
To this end, this thesis examines the differences in the way various nationalistic
discourses relate to the ‘national imaginary’ by employing various presences in the
terrain of the Republic Day holiday. Resulting from this analysis, this thesis argues
that the differences in the way various ideological positions relate to the Republic
iv
day holiday do not lessen, in fact strengthen the function of the Republic Day holiday
in the reconstruction and reimagining of the terrain of the ‘nation’, since the
differences in ‘national imaginary’ are expressed via interventions to the Republic
Day holiday which thus occurs as a legitimate referent ‘of the nation.’
Key Words: Nationalism, Turkey, Post-1997 Period, Republic Day Holiday,
Commemoration
vÖZET
28 ŞUBAT SONRASI TÜRKİYE’DE CUMHURİYET BAYRAMLARI’NIN
DEGİŞEN ROLÜ: ULUSAL İMGELEMİ YENİDEN OLUŞTURAN VE
ŞEKİLLENDİREN YAKLAŞIMLAR
F. Gizem Zencirci
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr . Dilek Cindoğlu
Eylül 2004
Bu tez 28 Şubat kararları sonrası Türkiye’sindeki Cumhuriyet Bayramı
kutlamalarını  ve bu kutlamalarin Zaman, Hürriyet, ve Cumhuriyet gazeteleri
tarafindan temsillerini; ‘Cumhuriyet Bayramı’ kategorisinin dinamizminin, ‘Türk
ulusu’ kategorisinin dinamizmine denk geldigi perspektifine dayanarak  ele almıştır.
Bu amaçla, bu tez bu üç gazetenin Cumhuriyet Bayramı kutlamalarına
yaklaşımlarında geliştirdikleri farklılıkları incelemektedir Bu inceleme sonucunda,
bu tez farklı ideolojik söylemlerin Cumhuriyet Bayramına dair farklı yaklaşımlarının,
Cumhuriyet Bayramı’nın ‘ulusal imgelem’in sürdürülmesindeki rolünü
vi
azaltmadığını, aksine güçlendirdiğini öne sürmektedir, çünkü yaklaşımlardaki bu
farklılık Cumhuriyet Bayramı’nın ‘ulusal imgelem’i temsil etme ve ona atıfta
bulunma rolünü Cumhuriyet Bayramı’nın her koşulda ‘ulusa dair’ olmasi sebebiyle
desteklemektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Türkiye, 28 Şubat Kararları Sonrası Dönem,
Cumhuriyet Bayramı, Bayramlar
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The reason that holidays and rituals are so revealing that they have a
very special place in the architecture of the society. To put it
succinctly, many sociologists hold that newborns are little savages
who become socialized by being introduced to the values of their
society. …Looking at holiday’s leads one to ask which values a given
society, in a given historical period, seeks to reinforce. (Etzioni,
2002:1)
The childhood memories of Turkish citizens are full of scenes from holidays
that they have participated throughout their compulsory school education. In these
celebrations they might have had a major or minor contribution: They might have
read a poem, might have sang a song in the chorus, might have taken role in a
parade; or they might have represented their school in the stadium celebrations or by
visiting the president on the day of the holiday together with other representatives
from other schools. Whether they liked it or not, whether they were aware of what
exactly was celebrated, from a young age they get used to the idea of the `nation`,
even though they were not aware of what exactly they were being taught. With
feelings of patriotism and belongingness, these school parades prepared these future
citizens with the national imaginary. The themes that were introduced in these school
2celebrations were simply national: military power, respect to the past, an awareness
of belonging, a link created between the past and the future citizens of the nation, a
realization of time and place, sacrifice, honor, fear and so on. These school
celebrations can be thought as the first introduction of the citizen with the image of
the `nation`.
However this thesis is not designed to study these school celebrations and
their affects in creating competent citizens in Turkey. This would require a more
extensive study with different methodologies, which is not in the scope of this study.
The research of this thesis focuses on one of the holidays among many others that are
celebrated in the school curriculum.  In this thesis the Republic Day holiday
celebrations and its representations in three newspapers; Zaman, Hürriyet and
Cumhuriyet in the post-1997 period are explored. On this ground, there are two
theoretical assumptions that this thesis bases its argument upon.
First, this thesis approaches the question of national identity from a
perspective that argues that collective identities are persistently reconstituted and
reinstitutionalized according to a present agenda. That is, this thesis takes the
category of the `nation` not as a given, primordial entity which is stable; but rather a
category that is dynamic, in which nation-states are argued to be constantly
reimagining and reconstructing themselves, redrawing the boundaries of their
imaginary terrain and redefining who constitutes a national citizen. Within this
general theoretical approach the question that concerns nationalism studies are
argued to be a `how? ` question as much as it is a `what? ` question. More clearly, it
is argued that `national identity` is a category of practice, that is national belonging
3and the awareness of belonging is argued to be practiced in everyday lives of the
citizens, such as in Olympic games, in football matches, in international competitions
and many others.
Second, taking `nation` as a category of practice, commemorative activities
are taken as proper sites where national identity is practiced. It is argued that a
commemorative activity possesses a ‘symbolic repertoire’ (Spillman, 1997: 31)
which includes themes that are crucial for the national imaginary; in other words a
commemorative activity provides a narration of the nation. This narration of the
‘nation’ with the symbolic repertoire of themes carries `commemoration` to a
position where national identity is both embodied and redefined. In that sense,
commemoration is taken as a dynamic point which corresponds and sustains the
dynamism of the category of the ‘nation’. More clearly, commemoration is taken as a
site which the national imaginary is embodied onto and which also serves to the
embodiment of the national imagination. Therefore the dynamism of a
commemorative activity, that is, the changes in the way it is celebrated are argued to
be a mirror of the present agenda of a nationalist construction.
With these two assumptions, the Republic Day holiday celebrations and their
representations in three newspapers; Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet in the post-
1997 period is the subject of this thesis. First, this thesis will analyze the Republic
Day holiday celebrations via their representations in three newspapers: Zaman,
Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet. It is argued that newspapers are crucial in constituting and
fostering national imaginary through their representations of various events occurring
within the country and around the world. That is newspapers are important actors in
4the drawing of the boundaries of ‘we’ and the ‘other’. The question of
whether newspapers reflect public opinion or whether they affect public opinion is a
question whose direction of interaction cannot be assessed certainly. Therefore this
thesis assumes that the mentioning of Republic Day holidays in these newspapers
provide clues about the way it is experienced in the society.  However, if our aim had
just only been to see the events that have happened in the terrain of the Republic Day
holiday, it would have been enough to look at one of these newspapers. The reason
for choosing three newspapers which differ in their political orientation stems from
another assumption of this thesis. It is assumed that the difference in the political
orientation of these newspapers can be observed from the way in which they
represent the Republic Day holiday celebrations, such that, their approach to the
Republic day holiday is shaped by the nationalistic discourses that they represent.
From this perspective some of the dominant themes that these newspapers use in
their representation of the Republic Day holiday will be examined and compared.
Relying on the assumptions that, nation is a construction which is
reconstituted and reimagined continuously and that from commemorative activity
these interventions and negotiations can be examined, this thesis has chosen the
Republic Day holiday celebrations as a research object in order to observe the themes
that are used in these celebrations in the post-1997 period. The reason for choosing
the post-1997 period is two-fold. First, it has been a practice among scholars of
Turkish politics to periodize the history of the Turkish Republic according to the
military coups. In line with his practice, when trying to decide the date to which this
study will back to, 1997 has been chosen since the 28th February process has taken
place on this year. By this choice, it is assumed that at least an insight into the
5political conjuncture of the post-1997 period will be provided by this study. But this
is not the only reason for choosing the post-1997 period for this thesis. Second, in
this period there has been an alteration in the way the Republic Day holiday has been
experienced by Turkish society. Marches and concerts were introduced as part of the
celebrative activities and the participation of civil society organizations in these
celebrations have increased. In fact, the Republic Day holiday was presented as
transforming from a holiday-that-is-watched to a holiday-that-is-participated in. This
thesis is not designed to examine the reasons behind the changes that have occurred
in the ways the Republic Day holidays are celebrated in Turkey. Nevertheless this
thesis will also question whether or not the Republic Day holiday has altered from a
holiday-that-is-watched to a holiday-that-is-participated-in, and whether or not this
alteration has been as spontaneous as it is presented to be.
The second chapter is dedicated to the literature review of nationalism studies
and studies about commemorations. In this chapter; first the ways in which
approaching the question of ‘what nationalism is’ is explored via examining
modernists, primordialist and ethnicists approaches to nationalism. Among these
approaches, the modernist approach which states that ‘nation’ is an imaginary
construction, is the one that this study will develop in its analysis of the Republic
Day holidays. The modernist approach regards nationalism as a modern phenomena
and this study will base its argument on this theoretical approach which takes
‘nation’ as an imaginary construction (Anderson, 1983) and argues that this
imaginary is being constituted through invented traditions. (Hobsbawm, 1992)
However, the base of this study does not only consider ‘nation’ as a question of
substance but also a question of practice. This argument is substantiated by stressing
6that nation and national identity are practiced in everyday lives of citizens, and
argues that the imaginary construction of the ‘nation’ can be understood by
addressing the practices of national identity that reconstitute and redefines the
‘nation’. Following this theoretical background, in the second section of the second
chapter, the extent to which commemorative activities can be taken as a proper site
for reading ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ are discussed. In line with Spillman
(1997) and Gillis (1994), this study is grounded on the assumption that
commemorative activities are points, which address the national imaginary directly,
hence looking at what is commemorated, when and by whom provides answers about
the ‘nation’ and ‘national imaginary’. Next, the specific focus of this study; the
Republic Day holiday is discussed within the general historical framework of
Turkish national holidays, stating that holidays are not stable points which societies
easily reach a consensus upon. That is holidays are assumed to be dynamic points on
which interventions, negotiations and contestations continue. Linking the dynamism
of holidays to the dynamism of the imaginary terrain of the ‘nation’, in the second
chapter, this thesis argues that studying commemorative holidays are a possible
means to figure out the major discussions in the imagination of the ‘nation’.
Since this study aims to do a similar analysis, the third chapter intends to
provide a general sketch of the main points relevant to the discussion of Turkish
national identity. Therefore, the third chapter addresses the question of national
identity in Turkey, with the objective of providing a historical background of the
development of questions of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’. Thus this historical
background begins with referring to the early republican period, namely to the ways
in which the Kemalist nationalist project constituted national identity in this period.
7It can not be assumed that Kemalism and its definition of national identity has
remained unchanged since 1920s, still it is important to understand the initial
premises of the construction of national identity in order to understand the current
conjuncture of the question of national identity in Turkey. Therefore, the emphasis of
the Kemalist nationalist project on science and positivism, the project which
prescribed the national self as modernizing and as a homogenous entity are
explained. Then the study moves on to the situation in the post-1980 period. The
jump from the early Republican period to the post-1980 period might seem annoying
for a chapter which argues that it discusses the development of the question of
national identity. This choice reasons not from since this study views the
developments between 1930s up until 1980s as unimportant, but when it comes to
the question of national identity, 1980 is a turning point; and most scholars argue that
only with the developments after 1980 the grounds on which Kemalist national
identity rests  on have begun to be challenged. (Keyman, 1995; Kasaba, 1997;
Kadıoğlu, 1997) Therefore in order to understand the main discussions about
national identity in contemporary Turkey an introductory summary of the
developments in the post-1980 period are necessary. It follows that throughout the
1990s the rise of the Kurdish problem and the rise of Islamism have been the most
important issues, and the reasons for these issues to become problems, are linked to
prescription of the Kemalist nationalist project which developed a certain distance
towards Islam as a religion and towards the Kurdish population by labeling them as
the internal other of the ‘nation’. Between these two most problematic issues this
study is more interested in the rise of Islamism although the Kurdish problem will be
incorporated into the analysis of the Republic Day holidays to some extent. The
interest on the rise of Islamism is associated with the 28th February process and the
8political conjuncture of Turkey in the post-1997 period is discussed lastly in the third
chapter. This discussion looks at three developments, which are considered to be
related to the objectives of this study. These are primarily the developments in the
post 1997-period with emphasis on military’s increasing hold in politics; second, the
development of Islamist politics in the post-1997 period and third the rise of
nationalistic discourses in this period. The issues that are included in this chapter
might seem so proliferated, however since the aim of this chapter is to provide the
background of the analysis that will be made on the following chapter, it is necessary
to be so, since the issues that will be included in the analysis of the Republic Day
holiday are diverse.
The fourth chapter is the analysis chapter of this thesis. As has been
mentioned before, this analysis is carried out through readings of newspapers;
Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet by looking at their representations of the Republic
Day holiday throughout the post-1997 period. In this reading there have been various
themes that have been identified, but the aim of this study is not to offer a statistical
comparison of the themes used in representing the Republic Day holiday between
newspapers and throughout the years. Instead this study argues that the Republic Day
holiday is a dynamic point that represents the national imaginary; and this point both
serves as inclusive of the nation and both as a point where negotiations and
contestations continue regarding the nation. Accordingly the analysis is organized
under three sections. In the first section of the fourth chapter; the differences in the
way these three newspapers approach Republic Day holidays will be explored by the
differences in the themes that they use in their symbolic repertoire addressing the
national imaginary. In this section the argument is that the differences in the
9nationalistic discourses these newspapers present can be observed form the ways in
which they represent the Republic Day holiday. In the second section, the ways in
which  the Republic Day holiday generally serves as a type of commemoration in the
institutionalization of the idea of the ‘nation’ by providing  temporal and spatial
reference points will be explored. In this section the argument is that although there
might be contestations and interventions in the Republic Day holiday, in any case the
Republic Day holiday serves as point in which the imagination of the ‘nation’ is
sustained. In the third section, these interventions and negotiations in the Republic
Day holiday are analyzed by the stress being on the specificities of Turkish politics
which are argued to be observable from the Republic Day holiday celebrations. From
this perspective, this study has refrained itself to look at three issues. First, the
military’s involvement in Republic Day holiday celebrations, second, to the instances
where the ‘headscarf’ question has found place in the Republic Day holiday
celebrations and third, the presence of the state versus society discourse in the
rhetoric of secularists` and Islamists` in the context of the Republic Day holiday
celebrations.
Following out the steps outlined above, this study attempts to show the ways
in which a commemorative activity can be studied, in order to understand the
imaginary terrain of national identities. It is suggested that the dynamic category of
the ‘nation’ can be followed from the changes that occur in the discussion of the
celebrations of commemorative activities. From this perspective, Republic Day
holiday is taken as a site where the discussions about ‘national imaginary’ in Turkey
can be observed.
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However, this is not the only intention of this study. A more important
question that will be posed is whether or not the difference in the way different
ideological positions approach the Republic Day holiday resemble antagonism or
harmony for the national imaginary. That is, the extent to which the Republic Day
holiday sustains in referring to and reflecting the ‘national imaginary’ in spite of the
different approaches that different ideological positions take on themselves will be
questioned.
11
CHAPTER 2
NATIONALISM, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
COMMEMORATION
In this chapter the general focus will be on nationalism and national identity, with
specific significance devoted to the practices of national commemorations. These
commemorations are argued as proper sites for reading the reconstructional practices
upon which national identity constitutes itself. First, various understandings of
nationalism are elaborated, with the aim to highlight primordial, modernists and
ethnicists’ approaches to nationalism. Throughout this study, ‘nation’ is approached
from a modernist perspective, thus Anderson’s notion of imagined communities and
Hobsbawm’s account of the ‘invented traditions’ that serve to this imagination will
be given specific emphasis.  Second, the focus will be turned onto national
commemorations by adopting Spillman’s argument which points out that looking at
national commemorations provides a full reading of the national identity; and Gillis’s
account that national commemorative practices are a site where memory and identity
coincide will be incorporated. On the light of this theoretical background, some
historical information about the practices of national holidays in Turkey will be
presented in line with the particular roles these holidays play in the constructional
12
and reconstructional affirmations of national identity. In other words, these holidays
are taken as a site where national identity is embodied and both as a site where
national identity is redefined.
2.1. Nationalism
2. 1.1 Nation as a Category of Analysis
Nationalism determined the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the
modern world. Thus being a nation-state has become the accepted standard to gain
political legitimacy. Although there is not a certain definition of what exactly
constitutes a nation-state, still the terms the ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘national
identity’ have been used interchangeably in studies concerning the relations within
and between states. Furthermore, there have been various approaches to nationalism
concerning its genesis; this debate is most often described as the debate between
‘primordialists’ vs. ‘modernist’. Though it is not possible to offer an all-
encompassing presentation of various scholars of these two different ways of
approaching nationalism, to look at the major differences between these two
perspectives are necessary to understand nationalism from a theoretical perspective,
which is the objective of this section. In order to highlight the theoretical ground of
this thesis, it has been considered necessary to present the primordialist, ethnicists,
and modernists’ approaches to nationalism among which the ‘modernist’ perspective
has been the theoretical basis upon which this thesis will grow on.
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2.1.1.1 Primordialist Perspective on Nationalism
The scholars, who adopt a primordialist view of the nation, bring an
essentialist view of the ‘nation’, arguing that a nation precedes the state, and it is
inevitable that a nation will self-assert itself into being by becoming a nation-state.
This view is constructed around seeing the nation as a 'sleeping beauty’, waiting to
be awakened by a nationalist movement in order to regain its status in a ‘world of
nation-states’ by becoming a nation state. This status of becoming a nation-state is
always a regained status, since the primordialist view of the nation always refers to a
glorious mythic past.  This is the general national ‘story’, which contains a
foundation myth, locating the origin of the nation in a mythic time, which has had
always involved the same community moving throughout history gradually.
(McCrone, 1998:28) According to Geertz, the concept of primordialism is defined as:
One that stems from the ‘givens’ or, more precisely, as cultures are inevitably
involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate
contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that
stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a
particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular
social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are
seen to have an ineffable and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of
themselves. (Geertz, 1973:259)
Thus, according to this definition the membership to nationhood is seen as a given
natural character which can not treated as an acquired status. Therefore the
primordialist perspective about a ‘nation’ assumes an existence before and a bond
between all the members of a group before these members even realize their
particular belongingness. Before a nation-building process is at stake, the future
14
members of that nation-state possess an unknown consciousness regarding their
togetherness. That is they do not know that they are part of a ‘nation’, but this
belongingness is ‘given’ to them, thus they will sooner or later realize their
membership ties which assert them the status of being fellow nation members. This
perspective suggests that the nation-building process can only revitalize a once-
existent nation, by making the members of that nation become aware of their
belongingness to the nation. In contemporary discussions, the primordialist view
does not find very much popularity, and the modernist view about the origin and
character of the ‘nation’ prevails over this essentialist view. However, still it should
not be forgotten that this view is the one that is taught to most of the children who
attend classes as part of a national education program in many nation-states, and at
least some of the ordinary citizens of a nation-state thus share this primordial view
regarding their nationhood.
2.1.1.2. Modernist Perspective on Nationalism
By ‘modernists’, scholars who have been drawing attention to the ‘invented’ and
‘constructed’ aspects of the nation, such as Gellner, Deutsch, Hobsbawm and
Anderson are referred.  By focusing on economic and social changes associated with
the term ‘modernity’ modernists argue that nations were largely an outcome of the
process of modernization. That is, nationalism makes nations rather than the other
way round, since nationalism is the cultural and political ideology of modernity.
15
Anderson approaches the question of nationalism from a constructivist
perspective.  His main contribution to the field of nationalism studies is that he
addresses the centrality of ‘image’ in creating a national reality. According to
Anderson, nation is an “imagined community”, and is imagined as limited and
sovereign. (Anderson, 1983:1) Nations are imagined as possessing four features:
having united members, being limited in number; being sovereign; and being a
community. (Anderson, 1983: 6-7) Here, it is important to notice that the idea of
imagination does not imply falsity vs. genuinity; rather it implies that communities
are different from each other in the way they are imagined. (Anderson, 1983: 15)
This ‘imaginary’ is the “ symbolic means through which a nation comes to perceive
and understand its distinctiveness, and separates itself from others, namely ‘national
traditions’ and ‘national cultures’, are the outcome of a process of social
construction.”(Gunter, 1997:57) Thus, the construction of the national self is a
process that is carried out by the various meanings associated to the ‘national’ in the
national imaginary. This ‘national self’ inevitably constitutes itself different from an
‘other’, which both draws the boundaries of the national self and thus sets a limit to
the imagination and at the same time the other’s otherness finds so much reference in
the constitution of the national imaginary that it becomes hard to set a clear limit
between a national self and its other’s. Although, in the practice of national
imaginary the boundaries between the ‘national self’ and its others are imperceptible,
still the existence of an ‘other’ is central to the construction of the national
imaginary, since ‘we’ are what ‘others’ are not.
This constructivist view of identity accordingly assumes that identities vary
across space and times, due to societal conditions and the changes that any group
16
might encounter. These identities might also alter because of the group’s own active
involvement in redrawing boundaries, asserting new meanings, interpreting their past
according to their present, thus constructing and reconstructing their identities.
Unlike the primordialist view, which favors an essentialist view, constructivism
emphasizes the role individuals play in the interpretation of their own environment.
That is, the ‘nation’ is not considered as a ‘given’ but as an ‘imaginary’ that is
constructed via the interpretation of the individuals that together claim to be the
‘nation’.
According to Anderson the emergence of a nation is realized through particularly
three stages in the European context. For the purposes of this paper, the initial stage
of development will be elaborated, since it is not a step peculiar to Europe and thus
can be applicable to a wider context in studies of nationalism. This first development
is linked to the other stages of development of the idea of nationalism, by being a
preliminary change in the way of thinking about time. Anderson’s point about time is
introduced by the idea of simultaneity, without, he argues, the genesis of nationalism
cannot be understood. The idea of simultaneity is realized through two dimensions:
simultaneity-along-time and simultaneity-across-place. (Anderson, 1983:5)
Simultaneity-along-time emphasizes the link between past and present and refers to
time as moving steadily from past to present. Simultaneity- across-place, the concept
of vertical time, refers to the ‘moment’ at which different things happen at different
places. Anderson’s argument is that, with the innovation of vertical simultaneity, a
profound change in the capture of time was introduced, which in turn played a
fundamental role in the emergence of nationalism. Accordingly, Anderson’s claim
places the conceptualization of ‘time’ at the heart of ‘nationalism’. Here, ‘time-as-
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simultaneity’ is not only important since it has played a role in the emergence of
nationalism, but also the way by which time is understood plays significant roles in
the way ‘nation’ and ‘nationhood’ is perceived. That is how ‘time’ is thought affects
how ‘nation’ is understood, and consequently the way ‘time’ is perceived, has the
potential to alter the way ‘nation’ is perceived.
As another point, Anderson argues that the development of ‘simultaneity as a
way of thinking about time, was supported by the development of ‘print-as-
commodity’. (Anderson, 1983:37) The development of print technologies in a
capitalist market place made possible the imagination of a nation across time, and
thus was essential to the emergence of national consciousness. At this point,
Anderson particularly stresses the novel and the newspaper as vehicles through
which the national conception of subjectivity has occurred. (Anderson, 1983: 25-30)
His point about the novel and newspapers is also tied to his emphasis on the
‘imagined’ position of the nation. He argues that, by the imagination that is provided
by the newspapers and novels, the readers begin to possess a consciousness of being
a part of ‘we’ even if they do not see each other face to face. That is, the daily
newspaper through its use of the vernacular makes the nation imaginable and
bounded.
For Anderson the conceptualization of the ‘nation’ is highly reliant on the
narration of the nation. Time-awareness in association with the emergence of novels
and newspapers, thanks to the development in print-technologies occupy a central
place in Anderson’s ‘imagined community’. Although, his account concerns
developments from the Enlightenment period onwards especially in European
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history, it is still relevant to the development of nationalism in Turkey. Indeed, his
emphasis on the relationship between the national consciousness and print-capitalism
cannot be limited just to the initial phase of the development of nation-state.
Accepting that newspapers are crucial in developing a ‘national language’ and
consequently a ‘national identity’, paves the way to arguing that newspapers are still
effective means to shape and understand the reconstruction and reimagination of a
national community.  Therefore, whilst Anderson presents the development of print-
technologies as a feature of modernity, which has affected the initial development of
national communities; his conceptualization is a dynamic one since it can also
consider the role of newspapers in various configurations of national identities.
Like Anderson, Hobsbawm also emphasizes ‘modernity’ as the defining factor in
the process, which has led nationalism to be a dominant discourse of contemporary
world. According to Hobsbawm, nationhood is constructed through “invented
traditions”, which he defines as: “a set of practices normally governed by overtly or
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate
certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with the past.”(Hobsbawm, 1992:1) This term includes both any
‘tradition’ that is observably constructed and formally instituted, and also those
traditions whose invention cannot be traced that easily. Hobsbawm argues that there
does not exist a difference between these two types of traditions when the rapidity of
their institutionalization is considered. (Hobsbawm, 1992:1) Hobsbawm’s emphasis
here is that, the specific tradition that is invented at a certain point at time, succeeds
in achieving legitimacy by referring to the past: which means that the ‘tradition’
gains meaning by the ‘referred past’ that is shaped according to the present
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conditions and priorities. He argues that the period of industrialization and nation-
formation utilized especially three types of invented traditions:
a) Those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of
groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing
institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose
was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of
behavior. (Hobsbawm, 1992:9)
Regarding nationalism, Hobsbawm’s account emphasizes that ‘invented
traditions’ are highly relevant to the recent historical innovation of the ‘nation’, the
nation-state, and national symbols such as national flags, national anthems, national
emblems, national histories and so forth. In fact, according to Hobsbawm, since the
‘nation’ is an innovation of modernity, it has been supported by ‘invented traditions’
through exercises in social engineering. This view demonstrates that there is no ‘real’
tradition in opposition to ‘invented’ traditions, as long as traditions are constructed,
institutionalized and mobilized for current political objectives.
When Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ and Hobsbawm’s ‘invented
traditions’ are considered together, it can be argued that nations are imagined
communities and this imagination is highly reliant on the institutionalization of
invented traditions. In order for the members of a nation to feel themselves within the
imaginary, there ought to be practices, events, activities that are shared by the
members. This shared platform provides a ground on which the ‘national imaginary’
can be sustained and strengthened. Here it is worth remembering that the invention
of a tradition is particularly carried out through the circulation of daily newspapers,
as Anderson has stated. Not only the initial institutionalization of a tradition is made
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known through the circulation of newspapers, newspapers are also crucial in the
continuity of the national imaginary.
2.1.1.3. Ethnicist Perspective on Nationalism
Although the modernist view prevails in studies of nationalism, there has been a
major attack on the ‘modernist’ thesis by ethnicists, which is deemed necessary to be
elaborated in this thesis.  Both Hobsbawm and Anderson argue that the imaginaries
are constructed by highly symbolic means in order to create a national community.
However, according to Smith (1988), this imagination can only be effective if it can
actualize pre-modern symbols. Smith’s critique of the modernist view does not take a
primordialist stance; further he particularly rejects a crude primordialism. Rather his
point is that, even though there have been major differences between pre-modern and
modern nationalism’s, still there are many instances where nations predate
modernization. He argues that alongside modernity, there is a set of myths, symbols
and cultural practices, the ‘ethnie’, which have been influential in the appearance of
the modern nation. In his words, “the modern nation, to become truly a nation
requires the unifying myths, symbols and memories of pre-modern ethnie.” (Smith,
1988: 11) That is although there might be other forces playing roles in the realization
of ‘nation-state’, there ought to be a particular emphasis given on the ‘pre-modern
ethnie’, whose ‘story’ is necessary for the appearance of a ‘true nation’. This
ethnosymbolic analysis of a nation aims at revealing the invisible ties between the
actual nation-state and the pre-modern national community. Although there may be
nation-states whose linkage to a pre-modern ethnie is obvious, still Smith’s account
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includes a dilemma. This dilemma stems from the fact that it is not possible to
understand whether or not the existence of a pre-modern ethnie has resulted in the
appearance of that particular nation-state, or the occurrence of that particular nation
state has been vital in the revitalization of the premodern ethnie. (McCrone, 1998:14)
The scope of this thesis is not suitable to seek the possible answers of this
question, but it is worth noting that among these three approaches to nationalism, this
study constructs its argument around the modernist approach which conceptualizes
the nation as an ‘imagined community’. In line with this theoretical background,
which sees the ‘nation’ as a site of analysis, the argument will be developed in order
to incorporate the perspective seeing the ‘nation’ as a site of practice, which is
believed to provide a solid basis for the thesis of this study.
2.1.2. Nation as a Category of Practice
The primordialist, modernist and ethnicist views all approach the question of
nationalism from a theoretical perspective and examine the historical specificity of
each nation, with the emphasis being on the genesis of ‘nationalism’. The discussion
generally emerges between two extremes. On the one hand, it can be argued that
prior to the formation of the state there is no ‘national identity; that is, that ‘national
identity’ was constructed and imposed by a founding elite. On the other hand it can
be argued that the substance of a national identity can only be secured if this national
identity refers to a premodern ethnie, or to an ethnosymbolic community.
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However, in the scope of nationalism studies, there is also an approach which
emphasizes the everyday practices, cultures and traditions of a nation. These
approaches perceive the question about nationalism as  a “how?” question, rather
than a  “what?” question. (McCrone, 1998: 4) In other words, if we are to leave aside
the historical structuring of nation-states and nationality, we are left with the
everyday practice of national identities. Once a nation-state is formed there occurs a
site of practice where national identities are on stage, and on this stage the ‘nation’ is
represented through various meanings, which are most of the time peculiar to itself.
This is the stage of ‘national traditions’ and ‘national cultures’, where the nation
simultaneously puts itself into being as a subject, and is an object that is shaped by
this representational process. That is the imaginary domain of national identity is
argued to be a domain that is dynamic, not stable in the sense of a ‘given’ national
identity. Leaving aside the particular historical, political and social circumstances
within which a nation-state is formed, the history of a nation-state involves the
reconfiguration of the peculiar ‘national citizen’ that it envisages.
According to Brubaker (1996:10), “Nation is a category of practice, not (in the
first instance) a category of analysis. To understand nationalism, we have to
understand the practical uses of the category ‘nation’, the ways it can come to
structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and
political action.” Here the emphasis is not on the substance of a nation, but rather on
the practices and processes through which nationhood as a political and cultural form
is institutionalized within and between states. This means that national identity is not
a ‘given’ that regulates relations between and within states, but is rather a category
which constantly renovates itself through representational practices. This national
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identity is under the influence of reconstructional practices, that is the subjects of the
given national identity constantly have the means to change and reinterpret this
national identity. In any case, in every nation state there is a continuous
reconstruction about national identities and national identity does not remain as it
was initially constructed during the formation process of the nation-state. This view
does not mean that the scope of nationalism has changed; rather it implies that the
practicalities of nationalism necessitate a dynamism entailed onto the category of
national identity.
Thus, the category of ‘national identity’ is open to the influence of the changes in
a given nation-state, in time and across different subgroups, and it cannot be
conceptualized as a fixed category.  According to Gillis, “national identities are, like
everything historical, constructed and reconstructed; and it is our responsibility to
decode them in order to discover the relationships they create and sustain.” (Gillis,
1994: 4) This view emphasizing the nation, as a category of analysis, is thus
preoccupied with the ‘how’ question rather than the ‘what’ question regarding the
nation, and creates a sphere of research in which the assumptions behind the category
of ‘national identity’ can be investigated. Although the assumptions and priorities
behind the construction of a national identity are important, these assumptions can
only be understood properly when the practices of national identity is examined.
In this study, therefore the focus will be on the practices of national identity in
Turkey.  This type of an analysis can be made by various devices, such as studying
historical accounts, examining specific organizations and time-periods, public
monuments or more specifically analyzing certain discourses associated with
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national identity. Through this perspective, the main focus of this study will be the
Republic Day holiday in Turkey, which is thought within the framework of national
commemorations, to be explained in the next section.
2. 2. Commemoration
2. 2.1.The Relationship between Commemoration and National Imaginary
Commemorative practices are found in almost all nation-states, and they have
been studied by scholars who have examined commemorations as part of the national
sphere in which identities occur in connection with other sites of nation-building
such as museums, statues or sports activities. For the purposes of this study, the
studies of Spillman and Gillis are of particular importance, since they argue that
studying commemorations are an affective way to understand the practices of
national identity and that commemorative activity provides a linkage to bring
together the ‘memory’ and ‘identity’ of the imaginary domain of a nation.
Spillman’s study compares the centennial and bicentennial commemorations of
the United States and Australia, in order to reveal what ‘nation’ has meant to the
citizens of these states. Her research largely relied on the examination of newspaper
texts and the documents of the organizations who have arranged these
commemorations. Through this examination, she reveals a large range of topics
which allows her both to analyze the use of commemorations in each case and also to
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compare these two cases.  Her close study of the centennial and bicentennial
celebrations in Australia and the United States reveals much about attitudes to the
land, to history, to international positioning and to prosperity in the conceptualization
of national identities in those countries. What Spillman found was, since these two
states were formed largely by immigrant populations, the way their national
identities are imagined is of a particular type, since they have a lesser chance of
referring to premodern ethnosymbolic communities As a result of her research she
finds out the differences and similarities between these two settler societies which do
not constitute the focus of this study. However her study opens an area of research
where national identities can be observed in the uses of symbols, and in meanings
exposed in commemorations. In her study, she refers to how centennial organizations
construct norms for the nation, such as the theme of ‘freedom’ in the American case.
She argues that, in these two countries there are symbolic repertoires through which
national identities were expressed, themes such as, international recognition,
international identification, a founding moment, progress, shared history, prosperity
and diversity were all used to celebrate the ‘nation’ in these commemorations
Spillman’s study reveals that analyzing commemorative activities is an essential
means to understand the practical display of national identity, since they come to be
platforms where intense episodes in a diffused field of cultural production occur and
represent themselves. In these commemorations, “meanings and values were
associated with the nation in a process of cultural production, selection and
dissemination which was itself embedded in a broader public sphere.”(Spillman,
1997:33) That is, the study of commemorations are effective in the aim of reading
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the symbolic repertoire of a ‘national imaginary’ since a commemoration serves as a
site where the national imagination actualizes, represents and reconstructs itself.
Whereas, Spillman views history and memory as a part of the symbolic
repertoires operating in commemorations, Gillis’s work places ‘memory’ at the heart
of commemorative activities of any kind. ‘Commemorations’, the collection of
articles, takes as its starting point the claim that: “identity and memory are particular
constructs and should be treated as such”. (Gillis, 1994: 5) Memory and identity
come together in commemorative acts, which involve the coordination of individual
and group memories. Even though memories of identities seem to be natural, in fact
they are deliberately formed; that is, while some issues might come again and again
to the fore, for other issues a society might adopt a collective amnesia. Thus, what
we remember and what we forget is a matter of decision, that is involves an act of
human judgment.  More significantly, the ways in which we remember is important
in studies of commemorations. That is not only what we remember should be taken
into consideration but also how we remember and through which practices we show
our remembrance is crucial in the aim to understand the importance of memory.
Gillis’s argument about the selectiveness of the memory refers to the ‘national
imaginary’ as well, since the telling of a national history always involves some
misinterpretations or at least the silence upon some issues which are considered
sensitive for a national cause.  Unlike the study of Spillman, Gillis’s perspective
adopts the concept of ‘commemoration’ not only to public festivals, but also to
museums, monuments, in fact to any act of expression that refers to an event that is
rather commonly remembered.
27
In line with Gillis’s (1994:6) perspective, memory and identity come to be not
concepts that we think about but are tools that we think with. The particular identity
that we place ourselves in, affects our perception of the world. According to Gillis,
‘memory’ of the ‘past’ can not be assigned the status of a natural object; that is, can
not be treated as an objective fact. Rather, memories exist only through politics,
social relations and histories. Moreover, memories are the outcome of the assertion
of a particular identity rather than another, such that every assertion of an identity
involves a choice that affects not only a particular group but simultaneously the
‘Other’s of that group.(Gillis, 1994: 5) When thought in line with, Anderson’s
conceptualization of the national imaginary, Gillis’s argument adds the dimension of
the ‘memory’, which is important in the conceptualization of both the national self
and the Other’s of that national imaginary. That is both a national group and both
groups within a nation make choices regarding what to remember and how to
remember it. This choice is inextricably linked with the norms and rules that assign
an essence to the identity of that group. In other words, ‘memory’ and ‘identity’
come to be norms, which through them the relations between groups are determined.
The role commemorative activity occupies in the relation between identity and
memory is crucial to understand the various processes by which the historicizing of
the past occurs. What is chosen to be remembered, to be commemorated, to be
celebrated, to be visited, involves a choice. The foundations of that particular identity
influence this choice, while some events achieve significant interest, some others
might not be considered worth to be commemorated. Moreover the interpretation of
any event involves choices also, as to a particular event might be interpreted in
different ways in different circumstances. For example, in the narration of a national
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history in history textbooks certain events are explained in detail, whereas some are
neglected or passed over only with superficial information.
Thus a study on commemorative activities is useful in two respects. First,
commemoration is a site where national identities express themselves. Second, what
is remembered and how it is remembered; what is forgotten and how it is forgotten;
what is commemorated and how it is commemorated in a national sphere are all
important determinants in a struggle to attach meaning to the various incarnations of
national identity. This is one of the ways by which the ‘nation’ as an imaginary
construction is communicated through national subjects. By looking at the above
posed questions, the priorities and boundaries of the nationalist imagination reveal
themselves in the sites of commemorative activities. In other words a
commemorative activity is reflective and referring to a certain ‘national imaginary’,
thus it is self-referential in its relation to the imaginary domain of the ‘nation’. Being
self-referential means that, commemorative activities both shape and are shaped by
the changes that occur in the terrain of ‘national imaginary’. It will be returned to the
uses of studying commemorative activities in an attempt to understand a particular
expression of national identity later, but first commemorations in Turkey will be
outlined, by relying on the analysis of national holidays. Within the field of national
holidays, the focus will be on the ‘Republic Day holiday’, since it contains the idea
of a ‘founding moment’, which indicates a point where the linkage between memory
and identity of a ‘nation’ finds a way of expressing itself.
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2.2.2. Turkish National Holidays
There are a large number of national holidays in Turkey. Although the initial
institutionalization of these holidays cannot be straightforwardly attributed to the
founding elite of the Republic, it still can be argued that they were part of the
‘invented traditions’ which were involved in fostering the imaginary of the citizens.
Thus national holidays can be considered as part of the larger scheme of political
rituals which are effective in producing emotional states by which perception of the
political world can be influenced. (Kertzer, 1988) In Turkey, these national holidays
were established in the early Republican period and have been consolidated over the
years with the assistance of a state-controlled education system. It is highly
interesting that scholars of nationalism have neglected these commemorations in
their studies of Turkish national identity, given that throughout public education,
every child in Turkey participates in a series of commemorations either in the school
s/he is attending or by taking a role in the events held in the stadium. Öztürkmen
argues that Turkey is a country rich in holidays and that the concept of holiday
should not be limited to national holiday celebrations. She organizes the secular
holidays of Turkey under four main headings:
(1) National Holidays, celebrated by closing state offices throughout the
country. These include: Republic Day, Atatürk’s Commemoration, Youth and
Sports Day, National Sovereignty and Children’s Day and Victory Day. (2)
Other important holidays related to the Republic’s reforms. These are
celebrated primarily in schools and the relevant public offices, but state
offices are not closed. Red Crescent Week, Language Day, Domestic Goods
Week), and Maritime Week are major examples. (3) Local holidays with
“national significance”, such as the Independence Day of a certain locality
when Atatürk paid a special visit to a particular town. “The liberation of
İzmir” and Atatürk’s first visit to Ankara are two examples. (4) Traditionally
celebrated local festivals, promoted and regulated by local municipalities.
Originally celebrated as spring festivals, such as the Aksu Şenliği in Giresun
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and the Kakava Şenliği in Kırklareli, these events generally host a prominent
statesman or a national star in search of recognition on a national scale, with
coverage in nationwide media. (Öztürkmen, 2001:48-49)
In this study, the focus is onto national holidays. The national commemorations
that are experienced in contemporary Turkey, all refer to a particular time period,
between May 19, 1919, when Atatürk started to organize the revolutionary
movement in Anatolia and November 10, 1938, the Day that Atatürk died,
commemorated as the National Mourning Day. Öztürkmen argues that there are four
major national holidays in Turkey. These are most importantly the National
Sovereignty and Children’s Day (23 April), Youth and Sports Holiday (19 May),
Victory Day (30 August) and Republic Day Holiday (29 October). (Öztürkmen,
2001: 51) However these holidays are not the only ones that have been celebrated in
the history of the Turkish Republic. There have been many others that were
celebrated once and then forgotten. Furthermore, the importance of any given
holiday has also increased or decreased over time. Thus, any study concerning
‘national holidays’ ought to be aware of their dynamic nature. Here the dynamism of
national holidays coincides with the dynamism of the category of national identity.
Later, it will be argued that national holidays are crucial in the reshaping of national
identities because of their dynamic structure.
The dynamism of holidays, thus, is exemplified by first holidays which were
once celebrated and then forgotten and second by holidays whose popularity has
changed over time. To the first dimension of the dynamism of holidays, an important
example is the People’s Houses’ Festivals’ which was celebrated widely throughout
the early republican period but is largely unknown today. (Öztürkmen, 2001: 49)
Apart from the abolition of a holiday as in the case of the People’s houses festivals,
31
second, the intensity of a holiday might change throughout time, such as the
Republic Day Holiday which was celebrated for three Days in 1930’s, whereas it is
celebrated only one Day nowadays. Finally, a certain holiday might become an issue
of conflict such as the Nevruz Bayram. The Nevruz Bayram can be considered as a
holiday that has been most intensively discusses regarding its origins and the people
who are going to celebrate it. Following the proclamation of the Republic, under
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the holiday was celebrated as the Ergenekon Feast in 1922,
1923, 1924 and 1926 and later celebrations were held regionally.1 In the current
conjuncture the Nevruz Bayram is celebrated unofficially and is attached different
meanings by different circles. According to Aksoy; (1996:2) the Nevruz Bayram can
be approached from three perspectives, being religious, ideological and as an
Anatolian rite of spring. Today, it is widely considered as an Anatolian rite of spring
but still the example of Nevruz shows how a holiday can create a popular discussion,
by being considered as the date to remember the Ergenekon (Myth of Creation) by
Turks and as a holiday of the Kurdish people by other circles.
Despite the large number of holidays, the studies concerning these holidays
have been of a limited number. There is not a proper historical account of how these
national holidays were first institutionalized or studies about the celebrations of these
holidays in the contemporary period. Sakaoğlu draws attention to the neglect of
Turkish studies concerning these holidays, not only they have not been studied as
sites of national practice, but also the historical information about how these holidays
were legalized, were organized or were abolished is lacking. (Sakaoğlu, 1996:4)
                                                
1 “Nevruz in Turkish Culture” (Website Publication:
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/newspot/2002/mar_apr/n24.htm)
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There are many other examples of historical change of these holidays in
Turkish history. It is not argued that these commemorations influenced the
development of Turkish political history, but rather that the demonstrations, the
speeches, the activities in these commemorations are shaped in accordance with the
changes in the foundations of the national imaginary. According to Spillman, “Such
organized public festivals have long been seen as important representations and
affirmations of collective identity, and they became important instruments for the
constitution of national identities during the nineteenth century.”(Spillman, 1997:6)
Also in Turkey, these commemorations have been influential in the prescription of
the national imaginary. These commemorations follow a similar path from the
beginning of the Turkish Republic, and are structured around a highly hierarchical,
non-spontaneous arrangement about who will participate in the commemoration and
what they will do in the celebration. For example in 1934, the sequence of events
was announced by the newspaper Ulus, before the celebration:
1. Nearly all the buildings, houses, public places, cars, even minarets must be
decorated with red and white ribbons, flags and bay leaves and be illuminated with
electricity.
2. The scouts and villagers who have come to Ankara, will salute the ‘Victory
Monument’ at 14.00, the process of salutation is explained in 4 steps, which I will
not focus on. However it is worth to say that the places where people will stand, the
moment when they will blow their trumpets, the sequence of singing the ‘national
anthem’, and the ‘Oath of Loyalty’ are all predetermined.
3. There is a special article about how magnificent the wreaths that will be
placed on the ‘Victory Monument’ ought to be, and even additionally a covert threat
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entailing by stating “The Municipality will take care over the excellence of these
wreaths.
4. All people are invited to the ceremony. However their places are shown in
the sketch, accompanied by a word of warning: No one ought to be in the place
where he should not be! The arrangement will be as follows: first the police, then the
military band, a squadron of soldiers, then the scouts and finally the people. These
grouping will be in 3 parts, and ‘each group will follow the group in front of it 25
steps behind.’
5. Cannons will be fired at night, and the public who hear the sounds of the
cannons, will stay silent in the “Position of Respect” for a minute. Then all the trains,
cars, factories will sound their horns.
6. During the torchlight procession, all the people who are included in it will
sing the national anthem while they shout ‘Long live!’ 2
One of the interesting points of these celebrations is their pre-determined
structure, leaving no room for any action that might occur as a spontaneous reaction
whether in a positive or negative manner. There are various ways to interpret the
essence of these commemorations. In Turkey, according to Özbudun, “Official
ceremonies are the means by which an ideal society shows its devotedness to the
rulers who have justified their legitimacy by the right to show their respect to
Atatürk, in these ceremonies the society (ruled ones) in their position of passive
followers learn and accept this hierarchy by this symbolic power demonstration. It is
certain that the ceremonies of Turkish Republic are elitist, hierarchical and
formalist.”(Özbudun, 1997:156) This account is not surprising, given the top-down
                                                
2 “Cumhuriyet Bayramı Nasıl Kutlanacak?”. Ulus, 29 October 1934.
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elitist project of Kemalism to create a monolithic Turkish citizenry, however the
predetermined structure of the commemorations cannot just be attributed to peculiar
characteristics of the Turkish nationalist project, but still they are linked to each
other.
The present study has come into existence by two interconnected questions in
mind. First, the high frequency of commemorations in the Turkish Republic has
made me aware of the fact that there haven’t been any studies focusing on
commemorations as a way to read the particular aspects of Turkish national
imaginary. This study is thus intended to fill this gap in Turkish nationalism studies.
Second, in the recent years of the Turkish Republic, there have been some changes in
the way commemorations have been celebrated and in their representations in the
newspapers. However, this is not a comparative study, designed to figure out the
differences between the ways in which commemorations were celebrated in the early
republican period and the ways in which they are celebrated in the contemporary
period. Rather the focus is to reveal the ways in which one of these commemorations
has been experienced in a particular period, namely the Republic Day holidays in the
1997-2003 periods.
2.2.3 Republic Day Holiday
 With these goals in mind, this study has been designed to examine the
Republic Day holiday celebrations in the post-1997 period. This period is chosen
since it will be argued that the 28th February process that had begun in 1997 opened a
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new period in the Turkish political arena.  In Turkey, October 29 is celebrated as the
Republic Day holiday, commemorating the day when the National Assembly
announcement brought the new Republic into being in 1923. (Çınar, 2001: 365)
Although the 10th anniversary of the initiation of the Republic into being was
celebrated more enthusiastically than any other commemoration before, the law
regarding the national holidays and regular vacations was only put into effect on May
27, 1935, which states that the Day that the Republic was declared (October 29)
should be a national holiday. (Özbudun, 1997: 146)
The reason for choosing this commemoration is obvious. First, the Republic
Day has a natural superiority when compared to the other commemorations since it
addresses the formation of the Turkish republic. It represents the idea of a founding-
moment, which has a fundamental basis onto the construction and reproduction of a
national identity. Celebrating the very moment when the nation-state was founded is
the main theme of the Republic Day holiday. Thus, the Republic Day holiday is
attached a special meaning in the symbolic repertoire of the Turkish nation, since by
itself it represents a chain of meanings in the specificity of the Turkish historical and
political development, with its providence of a site for the reproduction of national
sentiments. Second, the choice of the Republic Day holiday has also been influenced
from some changes that might be noticed in the celebrations in recent years, in which
political actors and competing forces have begun to participate in the rhetoric of the
Republic Day holiday.  Leaving the reasons behind the choice of Republic Day
holiday to be elaborated later, in the next section all the mechanisms through which
national holidays serve to the construction of national identities will be elaborated.
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2.2.4 Functions of National Holidays
According to Çınar, there are three main mechanisms through which
commemoration Days serve for the construction of national identities:
First, they are among the main mechanisms through which national history is
inscribed into public life, and are instrumental in the construction of public
memory. ... Second, commemoration days serve to locate the nation in time,
thereby historicisizing the nation. Commemorative celebrations not only
constitute the ‘people’ as a national community in the present, but also as a
community connected to the past. ... Third, commemoration days are also
effective means through which time is nationalized. The commemoration of a
historical moment on a specific day each year serves to structure public time
on a yearly basis, such that public life comes to be arranged around such
days. (Çınar, 2001:  371-372)
Thus, the functions of commemorations in creating and recreating national
identities can be examined under three headings:  first, the creation of a public
memory, second the display of the nation’s place in time, third the periodization of
national life. Next, these three functions will be explained more closely.
2.2.4.1. Public memory
All types of commemoration days serve as a medium to instrumentalize public
memory. First of all, the commemorative activity is a public event, which is a
platform where members of the nation confront each other; this confrontation
supports the phenomenon of ‘mass’ which is crucial in national imaginary. The
reference to the ‘mass’ is made by the crowdedness in the celebrations. This
crowdedness is an essential part for the inscription of public memory and national
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imaginary in the citizens’ minds. The crowdedness of the public event enables the
citizen to imagine himself/herself as a member of the ‘imagined community’ relying
his/her national sentiments on a more concrete experience.
Moreover, the commemoration as a public event enables the state and the citizens
to confront each other, since the mass gathering of the public event appeals to a
general and not to a particular audience. The direct contact between a huge crowd
and central symbols and activities of the state, has been an effective way for the
modern nation-states in their attempt to foster their legitimacy, to inculcate a sense of
solidarity or to create identification with certain key symbols. (Ben-Amos and Ben-
Ari, 1995: 165-166) This mass gathering becomes a part of the national memory, and
it is obvious that “commemoration days are a much more entertaining way to elicit
public interest and instruct people in national history, than, say, history classes in
schools. (Çınar, 2001:371) Thus, in commemorations days entertainment of the
people and seriousness of the state overlap, leading this experience to be of a peculiar
kind.
2.4.2 The Nation’s Place In Time:
National commemoration practices are an integral part of the whole national
history archives, such as monuments, libraries, museums, flags, histories. History is
an important aspect of the national understanding, situating a subject in a particular
calendrical time of the nation. In this sense, the celebration of the national holiday
serves as an indicator of the ‘nation-time’, as citizens imagine themselves both in the
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horizontal and vertical meanings of the concept of ‘simultaneity’ of Anderson.  In the
horizontal understanding of time, the participation in the Republic Day holiday
designates a link between the present time and the past; that is, the national citizen is
linked to the day of the declaration of the Republic. Thus, participating in this
national event is a reminder of who we are, it situates the national subject in the
calendrical time of the nation. At the same time, this commemorative activity
provides a horizontal link between the citizens of the state, since the national holiday
is celebrated by all offices of all of cities and of towns throughout the country.
2.2.4.3 Periodization of National time:
Given the high frequency of national holidays, the lives of citizens come to be
arranged around these Days. When the organizations of these holidays fall onto the
duty of the national education system, such as in Turkey, these holidays come to
periodize the academic year. According to Öztürkmen the students of national
education, had a close experience regarding the national holidays in which they
enjoyed costumes, the stage appearances, and the successful performances of these
holidays. (Öztürkmen, 2001:33) However, the periodizaiton of everyday life on a
national basis does not require a straightforward enjoyment of these celebrations:
“even if the public is not really sure what exactly is being celebrated, or they are not
informed, or they do not care; nonetheless their lives are still arranged around these
dates.”(Çınar, 2001:372) In any case, whether the public participates or not, enjoys
or not, still as members of society they are affected by these national holidays since
they become the constitutive elements of everyday life.
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Thus, the Republic Day holiday can be considered both as a tool by which the
specifics of the national imaginary is sketched out and can both be considered as
possessing functions in the realization of the national imaginary. In other words, the
Republic Day holiday has both a constitutive role in the national imaginary and is
both affected directly from the dynamism of national imaginary.
In this chapter, a theoretical background for the argument of this thesis has been
provided, entailing that the reading of the Republic Day holiday is able to provide a
reading of the national imagination, which is the objective of this study. In order to
provide this background; first, the primordialist, modernists and ethnicists
approaches to the question of nation and nationalism has been explained. Among
these three approaches, which take nationalism as a site of analysis, this study has
relied upon the modernist view which perceives the nation as a construction and
nationalism as an imaginary domain within which relations are organized in the
social and political world. Second, ‘national identity’ comes to be a site where
‘nation’ is practiced; that is studies of nationalism ought to incorporate the ‘how’
question as well as the ‘what’ question. In the aim to explore the significance of the
commemorations in the Turkish context, the later half of this chapter has been
devoted to provide an outline of Turkish national holidays with a specific emphasis
on Republic Day holidays which is the object of this thesis.
In line with this theoretical background, thus, thus thesis stands on the
assumption that commemorative practices can be taken as a site where national
identity expresses its symbolic repertoire relying on Spillman’s argument, and in this
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site practices of remembering and forgetting should be taken as particular constructs.
In other words, what happens in the Republic day holidays, what have been of issue
worth to be reported in newspapers, which activities have been organized, which
discourse has been used in the representation of these holidays are all questions that
are intended to be asked in this study.
However, in order to study the Republic Day holidays in the post-1997 period
properly, it is deemed necessary to outline the historical development of Turkish
national identity and some common discussions upon which the Turkish national
imagination has relied. This will be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKISH NATIONAL IMAGINARY
In this chapter the aim is to provide some of the themes and points of discussions
that have been occurring in any discussion regarding nationalism and national
identity in Turkey. In the previous chapter it has been argued that nationalism studies
ought not to be confined to an approach regarding nationalism and national identity
as a site of analysis, but also as a site where national identity is practiced in endless
negotiations. In the aim to examine the practices of national identity in Turkey, the
significance of commemorative activities and the peculiarity of the Republic Day
holiday in this context have been explored. Departing from the argument made in the
previous chapter, in this chapter the focus will be the specifics of Turkish national
imaginary that will be argued to be observable from the celebrations of the Republic
Day holiday in the next chapter. However, in order to figure out the ways by which
the practice of Republic Day holidays relate to the imagination and construction of
national identity in Turkey, it is essential to have some information about the
specifics of the Turkish national imaginary that will be argued to be observable from
the celebrations of the Republic Day holiday in the next chapter.  In other words, this
chapter is designed to provide background information about Turkish national
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imaginary. This background information is necessary to the analysis of the Republic
Day holidays in the post-1997 period.
In order to provide this historical outline of Turkish national identity, the
examination will be made in three sections. The reason for examining the changes in
the configuration of the national imaginary in three sections is because it has been
thought to be the most proper way of presenting the necessary background for the
analysis that will be made in the next chapter regarding the themes occurring in the
symbolic repertoire of the Republic Day holidays. First the early republican period is
outlined with the emphasis made on a homogenous Turkish nation progressing
towards modernization by the Kemalist nationalist project. In this section, the
emphasis is on the from-above nature of the nationalist project, which has led to “the
people” to be considered as objects of this project.  Second the changes that have
occurred in the post-1980 period in the national imaginary will be outlined in order
to show how in this period this initial project came to be challenged from different
groups in the society, with a particular emphasis on the rise of Islamism. Third, the
28th February process and the aftermath of this process will be looked at, since this
study is designed to examine the Republic Day holidays in the post-1997 period and
without understanding the 28th February process the relevance of the themes that
occur in the Republic Day holidays can not be linked to the questions of national
identity in Turkey.
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3.1 Early Republican Period
In this section the two faces of the construction of the ideal Turkish citizen will
be elaborated. Although the early republican period can be studied from various
perspectives, this study will refrain itself to the emphasis on science and progress,
which has resulted in first the emphasis on modernization and second on an emphasis
of a homogenous Turkish society.
In the construction of the Turkish national imagination, the focus was made not
on what the Turkish citizen was but rather what the Turkish citizen will be. The aim
of the nationalist project was emphasized frequently as to reach the level of
contemporary civilizations, in Mustafa Kemal’s words. In this project the companion
of the Turkish national citizen ought to be science. Having no experience equivalent
to western enlightenment, the Kemalist national identity took its guide to be the
scientific explanations of the world. Thus the Kemalist national project was inspired
by positivism, which was regarded as a true interpretation of the world based on
scientific laws. Thus, one of the basic premises of Kemalism is its emphasis on
scientificism, in Mustafa Kemal’s words: “Science is the only true guide in life.” The
belief in science is certainly an aspect of modernity, in the sense that modernity
offered a linear development model, which Kemalist national identity took at its
core. However, the will to modernization constituted just one face of the Kemalist
nationalist project, since the emphasis on modernity at the same time meant an
emphasis on homogeneity, that is; “Turkish national identity takes the nation as a
homogenous whole.” (Peker, 1998: 41) More clearly, the construction of Turkish
national identity rests upon scientificism and positivism, which in turn has produced
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two other basis of national identity: first, the emphasis on the will to modernization,
and second the nation being a homogenous entity proceeding towards this goal.
Now, these two faces of the Kemalist nationalist project will be elaborated.
3.1.1 The National Self as Modernizing:
An important feature of the envisaged Kemalist national identity is thus the aim
to modernization. Borrowing from the European understanding of modernization
based on the enlightenment ideal of science, the Kemalist national identity was built
around a claim to modernization and progress. The claim to modernization and
progress was constructed around a role bestowed upon the nation-state which was
going to lead the nation through the necessary education to reach the desired
‘modernization’. The formation of a nation-state with a defined citizenry was seen
essential to the process of modernization, and the process of modernization was
expected to be carried out by the nation-state. Thus, the Turkish nation-state had a
sacred mission in some sense that is in Mustafa Kemal’s words, a will to carry the
nation to the level of contemporary civilizations. To elaborate this character of the
Turkish nationalist project, Kaman puts the term ‘modernist nationalism’ at the heart
of Turkish national identity. According to him,
 In the Ottoman/Turkish experience the process of modernization -as-
Westernization was, by and large, a self-inflicted process....It progressively
radicalized and culminated in an ambitious attempt at wholesale civilization
conversion.  Statism and absence of direct colonial rule made possible the
construction of a national identity that was primarily modernist in character.
(Akman, 2004: 39)
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Thus, ‘civilizational progress’ was the most important aim of the Kemalist
nationalist project. The society ought to be modernized, in the sense of a ‘modern
nation’; in this mission the state elites were playing the role of vanguards to carry the
peripheral portions of the society to the necessary civilizational level. Akman, as
well as Kasaba (1997: 24), points out that the state elites of the early Republican era
perceived the periphery to be ‘neglected’ by previous governing elites.  Thus, the
people were seen as a ‘silent other’, who are passive and inert, and who can be
rescued from their situation by being educated by the state elites. (Akman, 2004: 36-
39) That is the ‘people’ were seen to be objects of the process of modernization and
were prescribed to follow the rules and norms that had been outlined by the
nationalistic project. This neglect of the people who have different needs and
different aspirations was also supported by the emphasis on positivism, which
implied a conception of the society as having invariable laws, which in turn,
provided a natural emphasis on social harmony rather than segregation. The
positivist understanding of the world, offered a rational true world to which each
person could reach by using his/her own reason, which was seen as a potential of the
people who were going to constitute the nation. However, for the Republican elites
the meaning of positivism meant that the state ought to carry out the necessary
educational facilities to carry the society to a level in which the people could reach
the true/rational world by using their own reason.
This role bestowed upon the state was supported also by the elite-led nature of
the nationalistic project.  According to Mardin (1971: 199): “The Turkish revolution
was not a movement buttressed by mass support. ... The civil aims of the
revolutionaries, i.e. the political and social modernization of Turkey, however, were
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not paralleled by popular demands. The Turkish reformation did not originate in the
thrust of the masses.” Here, the masses refer to the mostly Anatolian people in a war-
torn situation, who were highly illiterate and who were mostly living in rural areas.
The educations of these people were held through the reforms that were initiated by
the republican elites.
These reforms first started with the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, which
was immediately followed by the abolition of the office of the caliphate in 1924. Up
to 1930, various reforms were put into effect in order to transform the society. These
were most importantly; the abolition of religious courts, the reform of the calendar,
the dissolution of dervish orders, and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code. The
initiation of these reforms had mainly the reason of creating a ‘nation’ that was
modernizing and thus proceeding towards prosperous tomorrows. Moreover, these
reforms were an attack to the existing cultural practices, which were mainly formed
around Islamic practices. The initiation of these reforms was part of the construction
of a secular public sphere, which will be elaborated later.
These reforms ought to be considered in a broader framework in which various
meanings of the ‘modern’ were transmitted to the society by various agents of the
nation-state. The Kemalist reforms were not just designed to transform the state
apparatuses, in the sense of ‘creating a modern state’, but at the same time were
aiming at penetrating into the lifestyle, manners and behavior and daily customs of
the Turkish people. (Göle, 1996: 58) Consequently, the meaning of the ‘modern’
took different interpretations in the practice of national identity. Kasaba also makes
the same point, according to him, the Kemalist leaders were concerned with the
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formal elements of change, such as the outward appearance of people, the cleanliness
of streets and the type and nature of institutions. (Kasaba, 1997: 24) Thus, the nature
of the Turkish nationalist project as being ‘modernist’ was not refrained to the
institutions and agents of the state, but actually was aiming to transform the Turkish
society into a ‘modern society’. Here the important point is that, this modernizing
project was not initiated from below, but rather carried out by the state, that is from
above, this character of the Turkish nation-state is mostly referred to as the ‘strong’
state tradition.
 Thus, another notion that has to be figured out is the from-above nature of
Turkish nationalism, but this is not in the sense that the masses were mobilized by
the elites; rather the elites carried out the reforms even if the masses did not express
an interest in those civil and political objectives. According to Kasaba (1997:24) the
creation of a Turkish society was perceived by the political elite’s in Turkey, as a
project that ought to be handled by themselves in which they saw the people living in
Turkey as objects of their experiments. (Kasaba, 1997:25) Eventually the from-above
nature of the Turkish modernization project lays at the basis of some problems that
have been seen particularly in the post-1980 period.
The desire to modernization and the existence of some non-modern, (not
essentially religious but traditional) practices produced a tension to be balanced in
Turkish national identity deriving its existence from the definition of the national
citizen from the early republican period. The opposition between ‘traditional’ and the
‘modern’, ‘state’ and ‘society’, and the state intervention on the everyday life of
Turkish citizens has drawn much attention from scholars of Turkish national identity,
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but the analysis of these various studies would pass the scope of this study. It might
be sufficient to say that, the Kemalist national project, in the name of modernization
interfered to all areas of social life, to education, to cuisinary practices, to habits, to
family life and so on. This interference consequently led to a tension between the
modern and the traditional, state and society, thus the aim to govern the society from
a scientific perspective led to an implicit imposition of certain type of good life.  This
certain interpretation of good life included in it, what the ‘Turkish citizen’ would
constitute its place on. That is, the emphasis on modernization led to the construction
of a homogenous Turkish citizenry, which defined itself in relation to its others. This
emphasis on a homogenous Turkish citizenry will be elaborated in the next section.
3.1.2 The National Self as a Homogenous Entity
Thus, another dimension of the definition of Kemalist national identity, which is
a more behind-the-scenes emphasis, is the claim to homogeneity. This claim of the
Turkish nation as being a homogenous whole was important on the construction of
the nation-state and was used as a point of legitimacy. This point is illustrated by
Keyder (1997:153 cited in Peker, 1998:6) as: “If there was a homogenous nation
with a common past, their interests and future goals should have been common, too.
The state would be the narrator and the agent to realize these common goals and
interests.” The existence of a homogenous nation was, thus a means to legitimize the
existence and interferences of the state in the social, economic and political fields.
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This emphasis on the homogenous nation is formed around the definition of
national identity based on the concept of citizenship. However, the liberal definition
of citizenship includes a dilemma in itself which arouses from the definition of
‘identity’ itself. This dilemma has on one extreme a strict definition of citizenship
defined on bases of political definitions, and on the other extreme an essentialist
sacred definition of identity based on ethnic or religious affiliations. This dilemma
also constitutes the problematic of defining a group (not necessarily national)
regarding its identity. Akman (2004: 39) points out that “the issue of ethnic identity
was relegated to a secondary position in the ideology of Republican nationalists:
concerns with ethnic identity and nationalism were, by and large subordinated to the
dictates of the overall project of modernity”. The definition of the nationalist project
as being modernist, thus, puts citizenship over all other identifications, whether they
are religious or ethnic. In order to incorporate the whole ‘people’ into the common
umbrella of citizenship, the Kemalist elites constructed ‘Turkish national identity’
with the emphasis on homogeneity, such that everyone living in the territory of the
Turkish nation-state was defined as Turkish. According to Oran (1988: 235),
Kemalist definition of citizenship is definitely limited with the territory and takes as
its defining characteristic the common culture of the Turkish nation. Atatürk has
himself defined the constitutive elements of Turkish national identity as: “political
integrity, linguistic integrity, a common history, a common morality, a common
descent and race.”(Afetinan, 1969:22 cited in Peker; 1998: 39) This definition
bypassed all differences basing their claim on ethnic and/or religious grounds. Such
as, whatever the religious or ethnic affiliations might be, still anyone living in the
territory of the ‘state’ was considered as being Turkish. Hence the concept of
citizenship in Turkey is a gained status, depending on the commitment to the nation;
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thus the degree of belonging to the nation is calculated by the degree of performance
shown for the priorities of the nation.
Although this definition of ‘citizenship’ is positive, and is open to the
membership of all the people living in the territory of the state, still there were
reservations to the incorporation of people into the domain of citizenship. That is the
definition of ‘we’, the ‘national self’ constituted ‘others’ to secure the position of its
definition. As it has been mentioned in the second chapter, any national identity
needs an ‘other’ to define its own identity properly.
What the Kemalist national identity defined as the ‘other’ is certainly not clear as
much as its definition of its own identity. According to Peker, (1998: 47-51) the
‘other’ for the Turkish national identity was formed upon two grounds, internal and
external. She defines the internal ground as Islam and the associated Ottoman past.
Here it is worth to remember that the Ottoman past was reinvented by the Kemalist
discourse as being bound by religious inefficiencies, and referred to as the obstacle to
modernization.  In the aim of modernization, religion -Islam- was seen as an
irrational attitude towards the world, and the attempts were taken to rationalize it.
Thus, the nationalist discourse in Turkey, established a tense relationship with Islam,
‘religion’, by progressively distancing itself from religion, which resulted ‘Islam’ to
be the constitutive outside of Kemalism. The distance developed in relation to Islam
has been a visible side of Turkish modernist nationalism. The emphasis was made by
labeling Islam as an out-of-date way of governing the society, and everything new
was welcomed in the name of modernizing the society.  In the encounter with Islamic
forces, Kemalist elites presented themselves as secular, modernizing and anti-
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religious, however paradoxically the Kemalist conception of secularism, became a
‘official dogma of irreligion’ and was imposed on the Turkish society just as Islamic
dogma had been imposed in the past. (Adıvar, 1951:128 cited in Hakan, 2000:3) This
imposition of secularism, not only constituted ‘Islam’ as an internal other, but also
constituted the periphery as a ‘silent other’ that in time would be incorporated into
the national state, which supported the tension that had been constituted by the
educational role bestowed upon the state. That is not only the national state intended
to educate the society towards the image of a westernized, modern, secular nation but
also the state emphasized that everything associated with the past ought to be left
behind. Here it is important to notice how the state’s role in educating the periphery
coincided with the distance developed towards Islam, such that Islamic practices
were seen as resulting from the backwardness of the uneducated people, which
resulted in the expectation of Islamic-backward- practices to be left behind when the
state elites successfully complete their role of educating the society.
There have been many ways by which ‘Islam’ was constituted as the  internal
other of the Kemalist nationalist project, whilst  Kurdish population was constructed
as an external other of Turkish national identity. Kural (1995:99 cited in Peker,
1998:38) argues that, in the eyes of the republican elites, Kurds were perceived as the
only ethnic group that had a claim to ethnic separation in past, and thus were
conceived as having a potential distaste to the Turkish nationalist project. As far as
they accepted to be a Turk, to feel and act as a Turk, and to leave aside their ethnic
origins they were adequate to be included within the nationalist discourse claiming
the Turkish nation to be a homogenous entity.
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However, the emphasis made on the Turkic nature of the new national-state
created the discomfort in the Kurdish population, who were previously included in
the Ottoman Empire, since the Ottoman Empire had constituted ‘Islam’ to be the
common umbrella under which ethnic minorities came together. This discomfort led
to the Sheikh Said Rebellion on 1925, which was forcefully suppressed by the
republican elites. Although there had been other Kurdish revolts, such as Ağrı in
1930 and Dersim (Tunceli) 1937, the Turkish state have not considered these revolts
to be necessary to be known publicly, that is although the history textbooks
incorporate the 1925 revolution, they do not even mention other revolts that have
taken place. About the attitude of the Turkish state towards the Kurdish population,
Barkey (2000: 93) argues:
Turkish state feared that any discussion of Kurdish identity would contradict
the homogenous quality of the new nation. In effect, the word Kurd
disappeared from the lexicon and the Kurdish language was banned, names of
Kurdish villages were changed into Turkish names and parents were denied
the right to give Kurdish names to their children. While some Kurds did
assimilate and became Turkish, many others refused or lived beyond the
state’s reach. Even if the state refused to acknowledge the existence of the
Kurds, the issue would not die.
The ways in which the Kurdish issue returned into the political scene after 1980
will be elaborated later, but, it is worth to mention that the Turkish state did not have
succeeded in neither obliterating Islamists nor making Turks out of Kurds, still it was
successful in creating an “urban, state-dependent, guided and secular society, an
intelligentsia, a civil servant class and a state-nurtured state elite.”(Barkey, 2000:94)
This success was realized through the two faces of the Kemalist nationalist project,
namely a homogenous nation proceeding towards modernization.
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The definition of the envisaged Kemalist national identity had two faces, one
being the emphasis on positivism, science and modernization; and the second being
the emphasis on a homogenous Turkish nation that would work in the route to
progress. Although it has led to the above mentioned successes, still, this definition
laid upon two dangerous grounds; first, it included a certain tension between the
‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’, ‘state’ and ‘society’, which in turn created a distance
between the modernization project and its objects; second it constituted a domain
between ‘we’ and the ‘other’, which led to identity crises particularly in the post-
1980 period.  With the accumulation of the problems that it led to, still, the
dominance of the inscribed monolithic identity of the Kemalist nationalist project
was more or less effective up until the 1980’s. Although the mono-party regime
faced a serious challenge in the 1950, by the election of the DP to government, the
modernization project of Kemalism was to a degree seen as successful and was still
dominant in the state discourse. However, the post-1980 period saw a series of
challenges to the Kemalist nationalist project.
Before moving to the post-1980 period, there is still an aspect of Turkish
nationalist construction that is necessary to be incorporated in this study, which is the
role bestowed upon women and their positioning within the nationalist framework.
Since the ‘other’ of Kemalism, included religion which denied women’s existence in
public sphere, Kemalist mentality choose to constitute ‘new women of the Kemalist
era’  as a citizen who holds the right to participate in public life. What Kemalist
ideology offered to women was not something that challenged the ‘second among
equals’ situation of women, but one which just transformed it into a new platform of
Turkish nationalism which assigned new roles for women in the public and private
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spheres. In association with the modernist ideal of ‘civilizing the nation’, Kemalist
ideology envisioned women as a bridge between (western) civilization and the
(Anatolian) nation, in the hope of constituting a mutually obligatory respect between
Kemalist reforms and Anatolian Women, who were expected to save the republican
reforms from degeneration and who were saved from the fanaticism of Islam by
these reforms. (Göle, 1996: 64) Thus, women were placed between ‘civilization’ on
the one hand, and ‘nation’ on the other, the double burden of Turkish ideal women
citizen, hence forced her to achieve a healthy balance between west and east,
civilization and tradition. (Yeğenoğlu: 1998: 134)
In the construction of the Turkish national citizen, women were constituted as
‘militant citizens’ being the signifiers of societal change, and thus the domain
wherein which identities had been drawn was transformed. The category of the
Turkish women was utilized in order to emphasize the changing relationship between
citizenship and religion. This changing relationship between religion and women was
emphasized through the changing role of women in the public sphere. In this
separation the public sphere was constituted as a sphere where the new Turkish
citizen can be observed and consequently religion was confined within the private
domain of the individual believer. (Göle, 1997:51) In order to strengthen this
separation, the increasing appearance of women in the public space, by ‘unveiling’
them both in metaphorical and in real senses was instrumentalized. As Yeğenoğlu
says:
The unveiling of women became a convenient instrument for signifying many
issues at once, i.e. the construction of modern Turkish identity as opposed to
backward Ottoman identity, the civilization and modernization of Turkey and
the limitation of Islam to matters of belief and worship. During the early
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Republican period, the veil carried connotations of Muslim backwardness and
it was argued that a true Turkish woman had never been covered.
(Yeğenoğlu, 1998: 132)
Accordingly, the unveiling of women signified the opening from the Ottoman
Empire to the newly founded Republic. Consequently, the women’s place in the
construction of Turkish nationalism denoted at the same time the introduction of the
public/private sphere distinction and this distinction was particularly made evident
by unveiling women. Actually the public-private dichotomy is the basis upon which
western political theory is constructed, and the “idea of public is Western in its
origins and its basic features are understood as universal access, individualism,
equality and openness.” (Göle, 2002:174) This idea of public sphere was what was
offered by Kemalism to the society, and mainly to the women, in other words
Kemalist project envisioned ‘social visibility’ (Göle, 1996: 71) to women.
Obviously, Kemalist project introduced the public-private distinction in matters
of religion particularly. This distinction, which dates back to Locke, is essentially a
concept emerged in western political life. Essentially, the ‘public sphere’ denotes
openness and accessibility by all the members of the society, wherein they ought to
give up some of their individual tenets, that is their differences, to come together
under the umbrella of a minimum collectivity of mass being. On the other hand,
private sphere denotes a smaller space of freedom allowed to individuals wherein
they can more freely exercise their individual differences, but ought not to step the
boundaries of that given sphere. Especially, the public versus private phenomena is
the basis upon which contemporary theories of citizenship is constructed. From a
theoretical perspective, this distinction is reasonable and even necessary to form a
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common denominator of citizenship and of a national identity which is shared by all
the members of the society. The terms under the Turkish people with all “their
diversity of cultures and interests can live territorially together in the political
association” (Lehning: 1998:226) of Turkish state, is thus set by the Kemalist project
of nationalism.
Thus, the behavior and visibility of the women in the public sphere was an
important constituent of the Turkish nationalist imagination and has been the most
contested part of it by the rise of Islamism in the post-1980 period. The various faces
of the ‘Headscarf’ question will be elaborated in the section about the rise of
Islamism in the post-1980 period. Here it is worth to emphasize the role of women as
cultural carriers by their visibility in the public sphere is a notion that is central to the
construction of Turkish national imaginary, and such a role bestowed upon women
has been constructed in opposition to the Muslim imaginary.
In this section, the main focus has been the fundamental tenets of the
Kemalist nationalist imagination, first the emphasis’s on science, progress,
modernization has been explained, second the distance that this imagination has
constituted towards ‘Islam’ and the ‘Kurdish’ ethnic community has been outlined,
and third the role bestowed upon women as civilizational carriers together with the
introduction of a public/private sphere distinction has been elaborated. The aim of
this section has been to both provide a historical background of the question of
national identity in Turkey, together presenting some historical information on the
reasons these issues have been problematic in the Turkish context. These issues are
linked to the study of Republic Day holidays in the next chapter. In other words,
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since this thesis argues that the issues that occur in the symbolic repertoire of the
Republic Day holiday are reflections of the issues that occur in the discussion of
national identity in Turkey, without understanding the impact of the societal
engineering that the Kemalist nationalist project it could not have been possible to
carry out the desired analysis.
The intention of societal engineering carried out by a strong state was not
uncomplicated, as it had been conceived. The problems that the nation-state had
encountered prior to the 1990’s was mostly handled by the Turkish military, this
point is noted by Barkey (2000:97) as:
Well before the troubles of the 1990’s, the military intervened on three
different occasions to bring events and errant political processes under control
starting in 1960. Reliance on its military to save the day when faced with
crises has made this institution a fixture of everyday political life. The
Turkish General Staff, as the representative of the highest echelons of the
military, has become an arbiter and, in many cases the originator of policy
decisions.
The interventions of the military sustained the ‘strong’ role of the Turkish state,
and thus the state-led modernization project was carried up until late 1970’s, despite
various problems faced. The role of the military in Turkish political scene was once
more evident in the 1980 Coup, in the next section the focus will be the post-1980
period with the changes that has been brought to Turkish political and social life.
58
3.2. Post-1980 Period
As a date, 1980 ensembles various moments in Turkish history; in economic,
political, and social matters. Moreover, in the last two decades Turkey has been
affected from the processes of globalization. That is not only the change that has
been brought by the military intervention has affected Turkey in the post-1980
period, but also the changes in the communication technologies affected Turkey.
Before moving on to discuss what these changes have meant in the Turkish context,
the immediate situation before the military coup and the changes that have been
brought by the new regime in economic, social and political matters will be
elaborated.
The immediate situation before the military coup designated the problems that
required attention by the new regime. In the economic sphere, in late 1970’s, Turkey
was in a condition of economic turmoil, since the economic model of import-
substitution proved inefficient vis-à-vis the oil crisis. In the political sphere, the
society was divided along political groups and the weak coalition governments were
unable to create political and economic stability. These problems were intended to be
solved by the military when they intervened on 12 September 1980, which perceived
the situation more problematic than before. Thus, the 1980 coup is considered as “an
attempt by the military to shore up the defenses of what it perceived to be a
weakened state under assault by Leftists, Islamists and Kurds by returning to the
ideological precepts of the Kemalist era.” (Barkey, 2000:88)
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The post-1980 regime began by attempts to solve the chronic problems of
Turkey with an emphasis on the Kemalist conception of Turkish national identity
with some corrections appropriate to the political and economic conjuncture.
According to Öniş (1997:751), in the political sphere, the military government
approached the problems by primarily two actions taken. The first was the
employment of Islam by the military elite in order to form a control over the leftist
political parties. The outcomes of the employment of a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’
bringing together nationalist and religious elements has been various, and to a large
extent has been held responsible for the emergence of Islamism throughout 1990s.
The second action taken by the military was the closure of political parties, and the
introduction of a % 10 threshold in order to limit the participation of small parties in
politics. (Peker, 1998: 71-73)Although, these measures were taken in order to
prevent the fragmentation of the political system and to bring political stability, with
the lift on the ban of political leaders, the leaders came back to the political arena
after 1987, such as Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel. Öniş (1997:749) argues
that, this has resulted in the existence of two major parties in the left and the right,
which provided an opportunity for more marginal parties.
In the economic sphere, the solution was initiated as the passage to a market-
oriented economic model. This need aroused partly from the realization that Turkey
had to open its economy to the world and to adjust its main economic mechanisms in
accordance with the prescriptions of global capitalism. The initiation of the structural
adjustment programs by the IMF, entitled the restrictions on imports to be lifted, the
Turkish Lira to be adjusted to international rates of exchange, and the reducement of
state subsidies. The understanding towards economy thus entered into a
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transformation, in this new phase the emphasis was on the liberalization of the
economy and privatization. (Peker, 1997: 74-76)
 .2.1 Multiplication of Identities
These changes in the economic and political sphere were a serious challenge
to the hegemony of Kemalist national identity.  In contrast to the colorlessness of the
previous period, the new period signaled a multiplication of the opportunities that
social and political forces could employ for the goal of recognition.  As Kadıoğlu
(1997: 192) claims:
The Republican state which fostered a Jacobin mentality, led to the creation
of an official, monolithic, absolute Turkish identity either by suppressing or
by ignoring the multiple identities that came to be imprisoned in the
periphery. The political climate that prevailed in the 1980’s and the early
1990’s has opened the Kemalist Pandora’s box out of which have emerged
multiple identities making references to the different sects of Islam and
Kurds.
Accordingly, the 1980 military intervention opened a “discursive space for
the revitalization of the language of difference, a discursive space for the
marginalized and silenced identity to surface and express its resistance to the national
secular identity.” (Keyman, 1995:113) More clearly, the imposition of the monolithic
Kemalist identity can be seen as a reason for the increase in the requests for public
visibility by various groups in the post-1980 period alongside with the new measure
taken by the military government. According to Kasaba, the reason for the increase
in the claim to identity in the post-1980 period, is not just based on the new measures
taken by the military government. He argues that,
61
By the 1980’s, the situation had changed completely. The Turkish people,
few of whom now remembered the early years of the republic, had grown
extremely suspicious of, and downright cynical about, the latest incarnations
of the promises of ‘enlightenment and prosperous tomorrows.’ Instead of
making further sacrifices for a future that kept eluding them, they were
starting to inquire about the institutions, beliefs, identities and cultures from
which they had been forcefully separated.  (Kasaba, 1997:16)
This inquiry of Turkish citizens was partially supported by the development
in communication technologies. In the immediate aftermath of 1980, the urban
population exceeded the rural population, and the metropolitan culture was under the
influence of international forces. With the changes in the economic sphere, this new
urban population was provided with fax machines, private televisions and radios,
computers, videos, and the satellite broadcasts of international television companies.
All these changes in the post-1980 period provided a ground for the Turkish
population to shift their focus. According to Kasaba (1997: 31):  “with the declining
hold of Kemalist restrictions and other state-centered ideologies, we are better able to
see most men and women living in Turkey not merely as objects of a project, but also
as subjects of their own history.” Kasaba’s account is an optimistic view about the
changes in the post-1980 period; however these positive changes carried along two
highly problematic issues, and the Kurdist and Islamist movements in the beginning
of 1990’s.  Since the Turkish people began to question the Turkish state, which was
appearing to be too much secular for the Islamists, too much Sunni for the Alevi’s
and too much Turkist for the Kurds, the monolithic identity of the desired Turkish
citizen began to be contested from all segments of the society. Each of these major
identity groups in Turkish politics, have had different causes and have pursued
different routes in the post-1980 period, however still they have one thing in
common that they are more or less what the Turkish state had excluded in its
62
authoritarian and from-above nature of strong state tradition. What Turkish state
envisioned as the “Turkish citizen was more or less constructed on a monolithic
character, by excluding the ‘public sphere’ to the plurality of cultural differences”.
(Gençoğlu, 1997: 42) This vision of Turkish society was not shared by all the
portions of the society, intensively in the post-1980 period it has become obvious
that each Turkish citizen had not embraced Kemalist ideology full heartedly. More
clearly, the answer given to the question: ‘Who am I?’ by Turkish citizens have
diversified, moreover all the answers had a political claim, at least a level of
acceptance of their existence, which brought individuals and the state which was
supposed to be representing them, against each other. Whilst, the individuals
emphasized their differences, affiliating themselves with the group that they belong
to, i.e. Kurds, Alevi’s, Muslim’s, the state was emphasizing what they all have in
common, and what they all ought to place above their particularistic identities, their
citizenship to the Turkish state.
The most problematic issues in the post-1980 period have been the rise of
Islamism and the rise of Kurdish nationalism. Throughout the 1990’s, these two
issues have occupied the central place in discussions, however the studies of
Islamism have greatly exceeded the studies about Kurdish nationalism. In the next
section, the focus will be on the rise of Islamism which has led to the 28th February
process. The other developments of the Turkish political scene are not considered to
be less important than the rise of Islamism, moreover it is argued that the
development of various nationalistic discourses through the 90’s have been important
as much as the importance of the rise of Islamism.
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3.2.2 Rise of Islamism
As I have noted before, the employment of a ‘Turkish- Islam Synthesis’ by
the military in the immediate aftermath of  the 1980 Coup, was determinant in the
rise of Islamic identity. The developments such as compulsory religious education
and the increase in the number of schools giving religious education contributed to
this process. These developments were accompanied with the emergence of Islamic
organizations (both in the form of political parties- the Welfare Party and Islamic
Brotherhoods). Furthermore, the visibility of an Islamic identity in the public sphere
by the ‘headscarf’ question led to a major confrontation between Kemalist secular
elites and newly formed Muslim elites.  The ‘headscarf’ question occupied a central
place in Turkish political conjuncture, and simultaneously it has been a point of
confrontation wherein the tension between the state and society, traditional and
modern can be observed. This question is also closely tied to the different
understandings of public and private spheres. As has been argued before, the
republican elites institutionalized the public sphere as a site for the implementation
of a secular and progressive way of life. This conceptualization of the public sphere
as a secular sphere was constructed particularly against the Muslim social
imagination. This difference in the understanding of the public sphere had mostly
been observable in the veiling/unveiling of women. Just as unveiling women had
been a tool in the institutionalization of the Kemalist nationalist project, the rise of
Islamism was signified by the rise in the number of women veiling themselves in the
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public sphere. The “struggle between Kemalist establishment and the Islamists for
the control of public space” (Hermann, 2003: 67) has been tied to the increasing
visibility of women wearing headscarf.
As has been outlined in the previous section, for the republican elites, the
construction of women and their roles as being the cultural carriers of the nationalist
project necessitated the unveiling of women. Unveiling, as a symbol signified a
break with the past. On the other hand, women for an Islamist interpretation, a
women has to be covered when she is out of her ‘mahrem’, thus in a “Muslim
context, women’s participation in public life, corporeal visibility and social mixing
with men all count as modern and even foreign”. (Göle, 2002:177).
The context, upon which the ‘veiling’ is discussed in Turkish political arena,
was not politicized before the 1980’s. Up until the post-1980 period, women who
adopted a traditional life-style, that is women to whom the nationalist project have
not reached, did not attempt to cover themselves with ‘turban’ but rather they wore
‘başörtüsü’.3 Mostly, the majority of women who have never given up veiling
themselves were seen as representatives of the continuation of traditional modes of
behavior, and this where the distinction between ‘turban’ and ‘başörtüsü’ arouses.
According to this argument, ‘turban’ is seen as a symbol of political Islam, whereas
‘başörtüsü’ is seen as a traditional way of covering one’s head. The one’s who wore
‘başörtüsü’ were seen as ones that Kemalist enlightenment and modernization project
                                                
3 The difference between ‘başörtüsü’ and ‘turban’ not only stems from the fact that the meanings
attached to them are different, but also that the way they are worn is different. ‘Başörtüsü’ is tied
loosely under the chin which might leave some hair seen, whereas ‘turban’ is a more strict and
deligent way of covering all the hair and the neck. In this study, ‘headscarf’ will be used in order to
avoid the complexities that might arouse from using these two terms which have different
connotations.
65
have not reached yet, and thus their headscarf was acceptable to some extent since
they have not get the proper education nor the proper tools to release themselves
form the ties of religion. These women with ‘başörtüsü’ were not against the
Kemalist nationalist project since they did not have a claim of being ‘modern’ like
the headscarfed women had.
Therefore, the post-1980 ‘turban’, is different than ‘başörtüsü’ since that
these two “represent different currents but also the different background, education,
public participation and militancy of the women who cover their hair.”(Göle, 2002:
177) The meaning of ‘covering one’s head’ is different than it was before; these
women are those who do not imitate their mothers or grandmothers, but are the ones
who deliberately have decided to cover their heads. Theirs is a conscious choice,
willing to distinguish themselves from the traditional style of head covering, the
‘başörtüsü’. The headscarf question has occupied the major place of discussions
through out the 1990’s that any discussion relating to the rise of Islamism has been
tied to this question. The reasons and motives behind the women’s will to cover
themselves is a question that needs a different research, but in any case, it is certain
that it “symbolizes the political aspect of the Islamist movement in Turkey during the
last decade.” (Gençoğlu, 1997:68)
Alongside the symbolic dominance of headscarf in the public sphere, in the
political sphere the rise of the Welfare party left no place to be suspicious about the
extend of the rise of Islamism. This situation was partly affected by the dynamics
mentioned as the outcomes of the policies of the military government, as well as
some other factors such as the fragmentation of the party system alongside with the
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weakening of the center in politics, and the inability of the existing parties to find
solutions to economic, social and cultural dislocations created by the accelerating
process of globalization. In the post-1980 period, the dominant representative of
political Islam has been the National Outlook Movement, which has had participate
in the political life, by the National Salvation (Milli Selamet) party-(MSP), the
Welfare (Refah) party-(RP),  later the Virtue (Fazilet) party-(FP), and more recently
the Felicity (Saadet)Party-(SP) ,and Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma) -
(AKP) parties.4 Here the focus will be briefly on some of the attributes of the
Islamist movement represented by the RP up until the 28th February process, and
then the route that political Islam has followed in the post-1997 period will be
addressed. .
From the onset of 1990’s the RP emerged as the standard-bearer of the anti-
Kemalist opposition and become the largest political party in Turkish political scene.
The RP was the organized political party of the national outlook movement between
1983 up until 1998, and justice and identity have been the key words defining its
ideology in this period. (Hakan, 2000:23) “The party made a Third-worldist
emphasis, favored an economic model of ‘just order’, criticized the traditional
definition of secularism and claimed to be ‘truly secular’, and employed an Islamic
version of nationalism, portraying Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world.”(Peker,
1996: 88)  The link constituted between the Islamist world and Turkey as being the
leader of this world, was partly supported by the references to an Ottoman common
past. Yavuz (2000:22) similarly states, “The National Outlook movement, unlike
other Islamic movements has not negated tradition, but has sought to traditionalize
                                                
4 In the rest of this study these political parties will be referred according to their Turkish acronyms.
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the past by creating an invented ideal Ottoman society that would serve as a model
for structuring the present and the future.” The ideological sphere that the Islamist
movement positioned itself open is thus a sphere which has been consciously not
touched upon by the Kemalist nationalist project. In this tension between these two,
the discussion was based upon an east-west distinction, in which Kemalist
bureaucrats claimed to represent the West and carry the nation towards
modernization, whilst the Islamists claimed that the solution for the inefficiencies
that the nation encounters will be found in the East.
The difference between the notions that the Islamist movement has included in its
ideological display, was moreover accompanied by a different attitude it has
developed towards the voters as a political party. Özbudun highlights this point as:
The RP is the only party is the only one that appreciates the importance of classical
door-to-door canvassing by hundreds of thousands of highly motivated, devoted,
disciplined party workers. Further, such activities are not limited to campaign periods
but continue year round. (Özbudun, E. 2000:84)  In other words the RP has
emphasized on the direct contact between the party officials and the voters, and the
manner by which this confrontation take place had been different from the usual
manner that the Turkish society had been used to. The attitude of the RP officials
implied a more direct contact, in which the party official did not have the intention to
educate people, but used rhetoric of listening to “the people”.  The ways in which the
Islamist bureaucrats have incorporated the notion of ‘civil society’ by utilizing the
state versus society distinction evident in the construction of Turkish nationalism is
pointed out by Yashin as:
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Indeed, Welfarists spoke in a culturally specific translation of the popular
terms of the contemporary West European politics of citizenship. They knew
the language of modern statecraft well. Mayors whom I interviewed, …
claimed that their party represented the real diversity of cultural life in
Turkey, in opposition to the culture of secular elites represented in entrenched
and monist institutions. (Yashin, 1998:8)
That is, the RP implied a sphere of the society wherein it legitimated its power,
and left the remaining sphere to the secular elites who were labeled as single-minded,
cold and serious in the way they approach to the society. More clearly stated, the RP
opened a new page in which the relation between the state and the society had started
to be questioned.  The implication of including ‘the people’ which was constituted in
opposition to ‘the state’, if nothing else, led to the increasing visibility of ‘civil
society’ used as a notion to provide a point of legitimization for power in Turkey.   In
her analysis of the ways in which Islamist and secularist elites have incorporated the
notion of ‘civil society’ in to their legitimizing discourse, it is interesting to observe
that these ways have been imitated by the secularist elites. For example, “the women
who have started ‘houses of learning’ have often admitted that they modeled their
practice on that of Welfare Party activists who had walked from door to door in
shanty neighborhoods in order to recruit people to their side and world-
view.”(Yashin, 1998: 16)
This is the ways in which the rise of Islamism has been realized in the Turkish
political scene. This realization and the encounter of the Islamist bureaucrats with the
secularist elites were not without trouble, and some particular developments led to
the 28th February process, which in turn led to the closure of the RP. The reasons
behind the 28th February process are not the concern of this study, but he
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implications of this process and some characteristics of the post-1997 period will be
elaborated in the next section.
3.3 Post-1997 Period
The time span of this study is not the 1980’s, it is even not the 1990’s, rather
it is the period between late 1990’s and early 2000’s, namely the post-1997 period.
Thus, for the study to acquire meaning, some of the key features of Turkish Politics
in this period ought to be figured out. In this section, there are mainly three issues
that are addressed. First the 28th February process will be explained briefly. Second,
the development of Islamist politics in the post-1997 period will be explored. Third,
the rise of various nationalistic discourses will be addressed.
3.3.1 28th February Process and Its Aftermath
The standard-bearer of the rise of Islamist politics, RP, carried on its
existence in the political scene up until the mid-1990. From the beginning of the
1990’s Turkey was witnessing the fragmentation of the political center, but both
instability and the rise of Islamism made it evident in the eyes of the secular elites,
when the Islamist RP formed a coalition with the Doğruyol (True Path) Party. For
the military elite, RP’s seat in the government was a very obvious sign of Islamist
reactionism, thus, they issued a series of measures to the RefahYol government in
order to prevent the supposed Islamization of Turkey. “Unlike previous instances,
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there was no direct government overthrow. Instead the military  chose to engage in
an ‘education’ campaign, whereby prosecutors, judges, academics, journalist,
businessmen and others were summoned to the Turkish General Staff headquarters
...” (Barkey: 2000:102) With the developments beginning on February 28,  1997, and
by the implicit intervention of the military, the RP was closed in January 16,  1998
by a decision of the Constitutional Court and some of its leading figures, were
banned to be a member of a political party for a five-year period. This process has
been labeled as the ‘28th February process’, and according to Cizre and Çınar,
This phrase was coined to indicate not only the far-reaching
implications of the National Security Council decisions, but also the
suspension of normal politics until the secular correction was
completed. This process has profoundly altered the formulation of
public policy and the relationship between state and society. No major
element of Turkish politics at present can be understood without
reference to the February 28 process. (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 69)
Although the 28 February event was not an intervention as large as the 1980
military intervention, still its effects were evident in the relations between state and
society. Given the traditional tendency of examining Turkish political history with
reference to the point of intervention of the military, it is meaningful to argue that the
post-1997 period signals an alteration in the reality of Turkish politics. Cizre and
Çınar, (2003:310) have argued that the impact of the 28 February process can be
made on three grounds, the effects on Turkish politics and society, the support
provided by the 28 February process for the increasing role of Turkish Army Forces
in the political life, and lastly the effects on the evolution of political Islam.
However, here the argument will be made on two other following grounds which this
study is more interested in. First, the development of Islamist politics in the post-
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1997 period, and second the development of diverse nationalistic discourses will be
explained.
3.3.2 The Development Of Islamist Politics In The Post-1997 Period
The RP was eventually closed down on January 16, 1998. The party was
immediately replaced by the FP,  which was again closed on June 22, 2001. (Cizre
and Çınar, 2003:323)  These two closures of the parties continuing in the line of the
national outlook movement impacted the Islamist bureaucrats and it might be argued
that it led them to reconsider their ideological connotations.
Because of this reconsideration; after the closure of FP, the Islamist political
agenda developed on two lines; the traditionalists and the reformists. In a month, the
traditionalists formed the SP on July 20, 2001. On August 14, 2001 reformists
formed the AKP. Thus, the 28 February process slowed the rise of political Islam for
about four years, and in the subsequent years, the Islamist political elites were
divided in two groups, reformists and traditionalists which take a different posture in
the presence of the 28 February process. (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 311-315) When
observed from the year 2004, it is highly reasonable to argue that this split opened a
better place in the political arena for the reformists, whereas forced the traditionalists
to the political periphery.
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The new face that the reformist AKP adopted was an entire breakup with the
tradition that they had come from. “The reformist JDP- persistently rejects being
Islamist, defines itself as a conservative democratic party, and emphasizes the
democratic character of the party organization, its spirit of teamwork, and the
importance of consensus-seeking in politics.” (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 327) The
results of the November 3, 2002 regime proves that the new path that AKP adopted
in their split from their initial party, has proved efficient, at least efficient enough to
bring them to power. The impact of this election is assessed by İnsel as a quit from
the post-1980 regime which according to him had aimed to impose on the society an
authoritarian and conservative statist conception of politics. (İnsel, 2003: 293) He
argues that: “The realization of such an exit, not by the traditional Westernizers, but
by a movement like the AKP, ... will finally make the normalization of Turkey’s
century old Westernization adventure possible.” (İnsel, 2003: 306) Thus, according
to İnsel the election of AKP  to office by the 34.3 percent of the votes, signaled a
period of normalization of the democracy in Turkey.
Whether or not the election of AKP as the government signals a period of
normalization is not the concern of this study, but it is certain that by year 2004, the
28th February process even if not ended has lessened in its impacts. Besides the rise
of Islamism, which have been devoted an important place in the discussion of
Turkish national identity so far in this chapter; in the last decade an obvious rise of
the nationalistic discourses in the Turkish political scene has been observed. In the
next section these nationalistic discourses will be talked about in the aim to show that
not only Islamism was on the rise in the 1990’s but there were also other political
actors in the Turkish political scene.
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3.3.3 The Rise of Nationalist Discourses
The state tradition in Turkey envisioned a nonpluralist nature of state-society
relations, such that the political elites were not accustomed to a plurality of voices.
As has been mentioned, however, the political scene in the post-1980 period was the
period in which various groups voiced their existence. The post-1997 period,
however was different than the 80’s and early 90’s, in the sense that the main
political leaders acted in line with a necessity to “comply with the need to both
stabilize the rule of the original Kemalist project and revive the myth of a
homogenous nation and society.”(Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 312) Partly from the
assertion of the Kemalist identity by the impact of the 28 February process, and
partly from other reasons, thus a rise in Turkish nationalism was observed in the
post-1997 period. The impact of the 28 February process on the rise of Turkish
nationalism, stemmed from the fact that in this period, “Turkish political parties have
retreated from constituency-serving position to a state-supporting one.” (Cizre and
Çınar, 2003: 317) The attitudes of the political parties have been dispersed to the
society as well. Cizre and Çınar (2003: 319),  argue that the post-1997 period had
witnessed a symbolization of politics by a particular understanding of politics of
needing a dose of moral injection in terms of framing public interest as the triumph
of the ‘good’ forces against ‘evil’, the victory of secularism against the creeping
threat of the Islamization of life. On the contrary, Bora assesses the same period as
an era witnessing the rise and bifurcation of Turkish nationalism. That is, the rise of
symbolic repertories regarding nationalism is assessed by Cizre and Çınar as a
reaction to the rise of Islamist forces, whereas Bora argues that not only the rise of
Islamism but other reasons were also operative in the rise of nationalist discourses.
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Bora (2003: 433-436) argues that, the reason for the outburst of nationalistic
discourses was Turkey’s confrontation with a crisis regarding survival and threat
occurring immediately after a course of self -confidence, that can be symbolized in
the person of Turgut Özal.  Throughout the 1990’s there had been various factors
that supported the self-confidence of Turkey, such as, the increasing accumulation of
wealth as a result of the change in the economic system, the belief that Turkey would
become a member of EU, and the optimism of ANAP’s Turkish-Islamic-Western
synthesis. However, according to Bora, this self-optimism was blocked by various
happenings in the beginning of the 1990’s. In this context, he refers to the Gulf War,
the realization of the unwillingness of Turkic states to consider Turkey as their
unconditional leader and the increasing signs of economic inefficiency. (Bora, 2003:
435)
Thus, Bora argues that the Turkish society responded to the crisis of self-
confidence from different sites of nationalist discourses. He numerates five ways of
nationalism that have developed in this process. These are official Kemalist
nationalism, left-wing Kemalist nationalism, liberal neo nationalism, Turkist radical
nationalism and Islamist nationalism. (2003: 436) Whilst each of these had rhetoric
of their own, with accompanying languages and symbols; Bora argues that,
(2003:438) liberal nationalism has formed the dominant pattern of the Turkish
nationalistic discourse. With the emphasis on prosperity, economic development,
consumer-culture, liberal nationalism emphasizes the progressivist -
developmentalist aspect of the process of modernization. (2003: 436-441) When
taken altogether, thus the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s have seen a rise in the
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nationalistic discourses, that is, in this period: “Nationalism’s tyrannizing discourse
dominates politics and everyday life.” (Bora, 2003: 450)
In this chapter, a general scheme of the development of Turkish politics of
national identity has been drawn. For this aim, first the early republican period has
been examined with an emphasis on science, civilizational progress, modernization
and homogeneity. Than the changes that have occurred in the post-1980 period in the
Turkish political scene have been illustrated. These have provided the background to
understand the political conjuncture in the aftermath of the 28th February process.
Although most of the issues that have been touched upon in this chapter are
important for the analysis of the Republic day holidays, still three issues among
others are more vital. These are first, the degree to which the notion of ‘civil society’
has been incorporated in the discourse of politicians; second the rise of Islamism and
the changes that have occurred in its path in the post-1997 period; and third, the rise
of nationalistic discourses. These three issues will be especially addressed in the
analysis that will be made in the next chapter.
This study is partly interested in the post-1997 period with specific reference
to the nationalist discourses and the ways in which they were symbolized in the
Republic Day holidays. However, in accordance with the aim of conducting this
chapter, everything that has been mentioned to be crucial in the construction and
realization of Turkish national identity will be incorporated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REPUBLIC DAY HOLIDAY CELEBRATIONS AND
THEIR REPRESENTATIONS IN THE NEWSPAPERS
      In this chapter, the objective is to examine the Republic Day holiday celebrations
in the post-1997 period in Turkey by utilizing the representations of these holidays in
three newspapers; Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet. This analysis will be made via
the theoretical framework that has been outlined in the second chapter and by
searching for the themes that have been dominant in the symbolic repertoire of
Turkish nationalist imaginary which has been explained in the previous chapter.
Throughout the years covered by this study, the celebration of the Republic Day
holidays has taken various forms. Thus, it is argued in the newspaper articles about
the holiday that there has been an alteration in the way Republic Day holidays are
experienced by the society in recent years. Öztürkmen (2001: 47) argues that earlier
the formalism and the over-emphasized nationalism of celebrations eventually
created a sense of alienation; whilst at the same has had an accumulative effect upon
successive generations.  Öztürkmen gives 1994, the year when the Islamist Welfare
party assumed power over the municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara, as the date
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since when there has been a remarkable revival of the national holiday celebrations.
1994 is also pointed out by Yashin (1998: 15) as the date when the secular
bureaucrats became aware of the rise of Islamism, and started to employ similar
gestures like those of the Islamist bureaucrats who were using the rhetoric of
incorporating civil society organizations into their discourse. Yashin gives the
example of the 1994 Republic Day holiday as the year when this incorporation of the
civil society rhetoric into the discourse of both the Islamist and secularist bureaucrats
gained significance. This study admits that 1994, the year in which the Welfare Party
won the municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul, can be considered as the starting
point of a change in the way the Republic Day holiday has been experienced,
perceived and presented.   In this study, however, the focus is not the post-1994
period, but rather the post-1997 period. The reason for choosing 1997 is because that
1997 is the year on which the 28th February process began and since that this study is
interested in the post-1997 period.
In the political history of the Turkish Republic, military coups have been a
periodically recurring event. The causes and results, the overarching effects, the
uncalculated responses experienced by the society after the 1960, 1971 and 1980
coups have received significant attention from scholars of Turkish politics. (such as:
Özbudun, 2000; Heper, 1985) Consequently, periodization of the study of Turkish
political development in terms of military interventions has been a common practice
among scholars of Turkish Politics.
In contrast to previous coups, the most recent, so called ‘postmodern’ military
intervention of 1997, has been studied mostly for its causes, whereas its results and
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whether or not it signals a new period with distinguishing features, has not yet
received much attention in academic studies. There might be particular reasons lying
behind this attitude towards the ‘28th February process’. First, since it is a more
recent intervention, its effects on society have not yet been very much observable
and there is still an uncertainty about the scope of its effects. Even if, this military
intervention was staged against the rise of Islamism in the Turkish political scene,
still it is reasonable to assume that its effects were not just restricted to that particular
group.  Second, throughout the 28th February process the military did not take on
power officially, but rather operated behind the scenes. This attitude has led for the
28th February process to be considered as a ‘post-modern coup’, thus its obvious
effects have been less explicitly known publicly.
Nevertheless, like the previous military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1981
it is reasonable to assume that the ‘28th February process’ has a particular place in
understanding recent Turkish political development. Thus, studying Turkish political
history by taking 1997 as a turning point to some extent and approaching the post-
1997 period as the fifth period of the political history of the Republic of Turkey
seems to be a plausible starting point. Kışlalı, separates the political history of the
Turkish Republic into five periods for which he takes each military coup as a
signifier of the consequent period. Although his argument about the fifth period can
be considered as questionable, in which he claims that a “return to Kemalism” with
the support of civil society organizations is the main theme of the post-1997 period,
still his account is remarkable since it shows how Turkish political history is
conceived.5  Supposing that this period has some distinct as-yet unexplored features,
                                                
5 Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner.  Cumhuriyet, 28 October, 1998
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is the beginning point of this thesis. Naturally, the post-1997 period can be studied
by various means, and by focusing on various aspects of society. Accordingly, the
objective of this study is to examine this period with a specific emphasis on the
celebrations and representations of the Republic Day holidays. The choice of the
Republic Day holiday is moreover appropriate to be used as a tool to explore the
post-1997 period in Turkey, when the argument made by Kışlalı signifying the post-
1997 period as a period when “return to Kemalism” is actualized by the support of
the civil-society organizations since that the Republic Day holiday celebrations,
especially in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 process, were a highly participated
event by the civil society organizations. For this reason this chapter has devoted a
subsection for the participation of civil society organizations in Republic Day
holiday celebrations in the post-1997 period.
The practice of the Republic Day holiday has been on the agenda of the
Turkish state since its formation. In the early republican period, the celebration of
‘Republic Day holiday’ was a tool of the nationalist discourse; it was the platform
from which the state exerted its existence, and created a stage for the members of the
society to imagine themselves within nationhood. Especially when the educationary
role the Turkish state has bestowed upon itself is considered, it can be argued that the
Republic Day holidays were used as a tool both to show the newly founded nation-
state’s organizational abilities to the world and the authority of the nation-state to the
national citizens.  Even though, the scope and popularity of the Republic Day holiday
has diminished in time, still it remains a public sphere for Turkish nationalist
practices. Previously, the Republic Day holiday had a consistent form which
included “sentimental poetry recitation, orderly but hard-to-adapt stadium
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performances, tiring custome parades, and an authoritarian organizational style”
(Öztürkmen, 2001: 51)  which characterized the “holiday” as a holiday which is
watched and followed through its stages. As has been pointed out in the second
chapter, the sequence of events was predetermined and no spontaneous participation
in the celebration of the holiday was possible. However, after the 1994 period, the
celebration of the Republic Day holiday became to be argued as being more of a
societal experience, rather than being an official Day celebrated only by public
servants of the state. Especially in the last decade there has been a change in the way
the Republic Day holiday is experienced in Turkey, which Öztürkmen (2001: 47)
notes as “a new approach to celebrating national holidays with rock concerts,
extensive TV coverage and public interviews had began.”
Throughout this study, this understanding about the development of the
Republic Day holidays as a transformation from a holiday-that-is-watched and a
holiday-that-is- participated-in is taken as another point of departure. However, this
study does not refrain itself by a bi-polar opposition in the understanding of neither
‘holidays’ nor the Turkish political scene. This study actually questions this bi-polar
opposition which basically argues that, previously the holidays were a holiday-that-
is-watched because of the ‘authoritarian’ nature of the regime, but nowadays the
holidays began to be celebrated as a holiday-that-is-participated-in since the society
is more of a democratic nature. It is believed that it is not sufficient to argue that the
Republic Day holidays have been a site where ‘the people’ have began to participate
in the celebrations rather than being subject to the predetermined sequence of events
in which they are expected to engage. Rather this study questions this argument
which implies that the celebration of the Republic Day holiday has basically
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transformed, and is more inclined to argue that “societies do not easily reach a
consensus on the idea of holidays.” (Öztürkmen, 2001: 47)
 This study will argue that the Republic Day holiday can represent and be
represented as a site of national identity, which is embodied and redefined from a
number of perspectives. The various perspectives which can be observed from the
practice of Republic Day holidays, makes it questionable to straightforward argue
that the Republic Day holidays have been transformed form a holiday-that-is
watched to a holiday-that-is-participated-in. It is believed that there has to be a more
detailed study of the so-called transformation of the celebrations of the Republic Day
holidays, which incorporates different perspectives on commemorative activities in
order to understand its different faces in association with how it serves the national
imagination of Turkish citizens. This study is thus designed to fill this gap in Turkish
nationalism studies.
Specifically, it is argued that holiday practices which have a commemorative
nature are not only important since because they refer to history, but their celebration
also creates a particular understanding about the society who participates in it.  That
is, the Republic Day holiday is not just a public event, but it is a site where different
interest and power groups interact and react to each other. This stems from the fact
that a commemorative practice by all its signs, by the manner in which it is
celebrated, the speeches, the actors, its music, its commonality and popularity is a
mirror of Turkish politics and society if we can read it properly.
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Approaching the Republic Day holiday as a political production of the society
acknowledges the importance of representative experiences. Among the four
categories that Öztürkmen groups Turkish holidays, the groups of national holidays
are most generally experienced by a large number of participants, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily.  Thus, if we are to look for the platform where
individuals feel their ‘belonging’ to a mass public identity, it is worth doing this by
the help of ‘Republic Day holidays’, which is where expression and experience
coincide, and the link between individual and society is realized, while the visible (or
sometimes not so visible hand of the authority figure (the Turkish state, the military,
the municipal government) is sensed.
This study will develop along two lines of analysis, which are linked to each
other. In both of these two sections, the assumption is that the Republic Day holiday
is an embodiment of national identity. In the first section, the question is the ways in
which the Republic Day holiday represents the nation as an imagined community.
The second section questions the specifics of the Turkish political scene with respect
to the varying attitude of various political and social groups towards the Republic
Day holiday.
Thus, the analysis is handled in a two dimensioned framework. This first
dimension approaches the question of Republic Day holidays by understanding the
‘nation’ as an imagined community. At the same time commemorative activity is
perceived as a proper tool to understand national identities. This section stands on the
theoretical framework outlined in the second chapter about the studies of nationalism
and commemoration as being a proper way to read national identity. On this ground,
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there are a number of interrelated premises, that this study is basing its arguments on.
First, the ‘nation’ is seen as a production of modernity, and, more significantly,
‘national identity’ is seen as a construction and reconstruction of meanings that
individuals attach to their national belonging. Thus, nation and nationality is not seen
as a given, but rather are particular constructs whose boundaries are redrawn
throughout time. Second, Anderson’s account claiming the ‘nation’ to be an
imagined community is utilized through the medium of Republic Day holidays in the
context of Turkish politics. The objective is to show the ways in which nationalism
operates through the representation of Republic Day holidays in newspapers while
tending to construct the ‘nation-as-this and people-as-one’. (Torfing, 1999: 193) The
third argument within the first line of analysis is, as Hobsbawm argues, that
nationalist discourses develop by inventing traditions. By utilizing his argument this
study is interested in the possible traces of the invention of tradition in the
celebrations of Republic Day holidays in the post-1997 period.
After analyzing the Republic Day holiday as a site of nationalist imaginary,
which provides a site for the construction of the nation and the continuous invention
of traditions to enable this imagination from a general perspective, this study, aims to
analyze the Republic Day holidays from a more specific attitude, this time
approaching them in relation to the development of Turkish national identity as
outlined in the previous chapter. In this second line of analysis, the main interest is to
analyze the characteristics of the celebrations of Republic Day holidays in the post-
1997 period. In this dimension, there are three main questions that are going to be
investigated. First, the presence of the military in the Republic Day holiday
celebrations is going to be examined. In this examination the question is whether or
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not the military has participated in the Republic Day holiday celebrations differently
than it previously had done. Second the question of ‘headscarf’ within the context of
the experience and representation of Republic Day holiday will be investigated.
Third, traces of the incorporation of the ‘civil society’ rhetoric into the discourses of
statecraft will be focused, in order to see how the notion of ‘the people’ has been
utilized through the medium of the Republic Day holiday.
 Before moving on to develop these two general lines of analysis, the years
covered by this study ought to be explained in order to provide the necessary
historical background to the analysis. In 1997, the Republic Day holiday was
celebrated afterwards the beginning of the 28th February process. That year an
attempt on behalf of the Islamist circle was seen, since the Greater Municipality of
Ankara organized an alternative concert for the celebration of the Republic Day
holiday. 1998, was the 75th anniversary of the Republic and thus the celebrations
were extended and at the same time supported by different activities aiming to
include the ‘the people’ into the Republic Day holiday. In 1999, because of the
recent earth quake the celebrations were down scaled, and hence the reason for not
fully celebrating the Holiday was a theme in the newspapers. Here the state versus
civil society distinction can be observed. In 2000, neither the celebrations are held
extensively nor the representation of the Republic Day Holiday is of a great amount
in the newspapers. In 2001, the celebrations were considered in association to the
place of Turkey in the world because of the recent 11 September terrorist attacks in
USA. In this year, the Republic Day holiday was used as a medium to express the
importance of Turkey in resolving the conflict between Islam and the Western
countries.  In 2002, the Republic Day holiday came just before the general elections
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on Nov 3rd, and so the celebrations did not create very much interest, although the
politicians participated in the celebrations to a lesser degree, while at the same time
considering the approaching election. 2003, was the eightieth anniversary of the
Republic. This year the ‘reception crisis’ holds a central place in the representation
of the Republic Day Holiday in the newspapers.
With the aim of studying the post-1997 period, based on the representations,
events, situations occurring and recurring in the site of ‘Republic Day holiday’, the
newspapers Zaman , Hürriyet, and Cumhuriyet has been chosen to cover. By
studying newspapers it is attempted to elaborate on the ways in which the Republic
Day holiday has been represented in the media. By analyzing newspapers of different
political orientations: placing Hürriyet on the center, Cumhuriyet on the left and
Zaman  on the right side of Turkish political spectrum, it is aimed to reveal the
attitudes in regard to the practice of Republic Day holiday. The time span of this
study is thus the years between 1997 and 2003, i.e. the post-1997 period. The
intention is to research media coverage of the Republic Day holiday in a longitudinal
study, by comparing the same context over seven years (1997-2003) and
simultaneously between newspapers differing in political orientations. Within these
sampling units, the data consists of all the articles in these three newspapers, in the
given time period, which are related or referring to the ‘Republic Day holiday’. The
time period within these years from which the selection of data lies between is, 22
October and 5 November, in order to cover one week before and one week after the
official date of the commemoration, that is on October 29.
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Another obvious assumption of this thesis is thus that the representation of
the newspapers is a proper and rich way of reading the Republic Day holidays in the
aim of understanding Turkish politics of national identity. This reading has a two-
fold objective. First the analysis of different newspapers enables this study to show
some differences between the nationalistic discourses that these newspapers
represent in relation to the Republic Day holiday. Second the analysis of the
newspapers provides information about the activities, and discussions that have
evolved around the celebrations of Republic Day holidays in the post-1997 period.
Relying on these data the two lines of analysis that has been explained previously
would be made.
Since this study has been basically made through the news articles that have
been collected from the newspapers, the main source of information has been these
newspapers. However, these three newspapers have not approached or represented
the Republic Day holiday in the same way, moreover there have been difference in
the intensity of the interest devoted to Republic Day holiday in the same newspaper
through the years of this study.   Before moving to the two lines of analysis
mentioned above, it is deemed necessary to first reveal the basic differences that
have been noticed in these three newspapers through out this study. So in the next
section, these newspapers and the basic themes that they utilize in the representation
of the Republic Day holiday will be shown.
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4.1. Newspapers
In the previous chapter, Bora’s classifications of the nationalistic discourses
that have dominated the political scene in the 90s in Turkey have been presented. In
this section the aim is to reveal how the three newspapers that have been used in this
study reflect three of the five categories of nationalistic discourses that Bora has
presented for the study of nationalism in Turkey in the contemporary period. Taking
Zaman as a representative of the Islamist circle, Cumhuriyet as a representative of
the Kemalist nationalist circle, and Hürriyet as a representative of the liberal circle, it
will be argued that their attitude towards the Republic Day holiday and their
representation of the various activities and events in relation to the Republic Day
holiday is an indicator of differences in their interpretation of national identity and
the national imaginary. These newspapers are not taken as direct representatives of
these nationalistic discourses that Bora has classified, but it is argued that these
newspapers are important media organs that hold a place in these nationalistic
discourses. These newspapers differ in the themes that they use in their
representation of the Republic Day holiday and the absence or presence of
information that they use about the Republic Day holiday is argued to be the
reflection of the nationalistic discourses they represent. This does not mean that
these nationalistic discourses are homogenous entities which are directly represented
by these three newspapers, still they are important in studies of nationalism, national
identity and national imaginary since they are part of the construction and
communication of the nationalistic discourses that have been dominant in the
Turkish political scene throughout the years of this study. One of the other two
nationalistic discourses that Bora highlights, official nationalism, will be studied in
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the third section of this chapter, in relation to the military’s presence in the Republic
Day holidays. In contrast to that subsection, in this section the focus will be the
representations of the newspapers in their manner towards the Republic Day holiday.
Thus, the Republic Day holiday is taken once again as a site, but this time, a site
where differences between various nationalistic discourses can be observed. It is
interesting that even Bora begins his article with an anecdote about the 1995
celebration of the Republic Day holiday, in which “all existing types of nationalisms
were present”.(Bora, 2003:433) Hence it can be argued that Bora also observes the
Republic Day holiday as a site of the ‘nation’ in which different nationalistic
discourses present themselves.
In other words, in this section our aim is to look at these three newspapers in
order to reveal their nationalistic discourses by looking at the themes that they use in
the representation of the Republic Day holiday. It is not argued that there are clear
boundaries between the nationalistic discourses that these newspapers present,
moreover they might even overlap. It is rather argued that the ways in which these
newspapers approach the Republic day holiday is informative about the nationalistic
discourses that they belong to.
4.1.1. Zaman   
The newspaper ‘Zaman’ has been incorporated in this study as a
representative of the Islamist circle, although there are other Islamist newspapers
such as Akit and Milli Gazete. The reason for choosing this newspaper is that it has
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the highest circulation among all the newspapers of the Islamist circle. Islamist
circle, as outlined in the previous chapter has evolved from an extreme stance
towards the Kemalist regime, to a more moderate attitude in its relation to the
regime. The way ‘Zaman’ represents the Republic day holiday is also indicative of
the change in the Islamist circle. It is observed that the number of articles written
about the holiday and the space allocated for the news of the Republic Day holiday
has increased in time, and expressions have changed from “this year it is obvious that
the state needs to emphasis ‘Republic’ as a concept via the extended celebrations of
the Republic Day holiday”6 to “people have celebrated the holiday hand in hand
without troubling about the crisis scenarios”7. These two different attitudes towards
the Republic Day holiday can be interpreted as in the first quotation the Republic
Day holiday is stressed as being an activity that is exterior to the reader, whereas in
the second quotation the Republic Day holiday is presented as an activity for tension-
management in the society. That is, the analysis of Zaman has revealed that the
attitude towards the Republic Day holiday is correlated with the attitude that the
Islamist nationalistic discourse has developed towards the state. Since the time-
period of this study begins with the aftermath of the 28th February process and moves
through the years ending with 2002-2003 on which the AKP government assumed
power, the rhetoric of the newspaper Zaman has been affected by the political
developments of this time period. However, rather than analyzing the differences
between newspapers year by year, it is preferred to look at some major differences
that have aroused attention thematically.
                                                
6 Koru, Fehmi. Zaman,  26 October 1997.
7 Zaman, 30 October 2003.
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 Unlike in Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet, in Zaman there are expressions which
incorporate Islam as a religion in the context of the Republic Day holiday, that is
“Republic-as-compatible-with-Islam” is the theme that has been largely found in the
symbolic repertoire of the national imaginary that Zaman envisages. That is the
people who visited Anıtkabir for the Republic Day holiday are presented not only as
visitors but also as people who prayed for Atatürk.8 There is a similar account
corporating praying and the Republic Day holiday, in which people are said to visit
graves and pray for the people who have died in national wars, with a note that the
mothers of the martyrs have visited the graves and have prayed for them.9 Both of
these two instances reveal an attitude peculiar to Zaman developed towards the
holiday. Zaman ’s attitude is that, just as in religious holidays, in national holidays
people are also considered to be approaching the holiday in a similar manner, in
which the respect to the ‘past’ is shown by praying for the dead. Moreover, there is a
phrase that has concerned the author at first sight, which is “Long living the
Republic. God bless the founders of it.”10, although this phrase can be considered as
an ordinary phrase which might not be worth of notice, still it is interesting, since
such a phrase can be seen in neither Hürriyet nor Cumhuriyet.
In addition, there is an article that has appeared various times about the
Republic Day holiday in Zaman, “The Republic is not against Islam”11  which tries
to bring together Islam and the Republic to a ground of compatibility. In this article,
the author argues that Islam as a religion is the most suitable religion for democracy
                                                
8 Zaman , 30 October 2001.
9 Zaman, 30 October 1999.
10 Çevik, İlnur. Zaman,  29 October 1997.
11 Zaman,  29 October 1999.
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and for a republican regime. This can be interpreted as part of an attempt to bring
religious motifs in the imaginary construction of the nation and state.
 All these expressions can be seen as an attempt to reconcile Turkish
nationalism and Islamism. Bora classifies the degree of nationalism in Islamism as a
perspective which places “Turko-Islam” as the core of authenticity of Turkish
national identity. (Bora, 2002: 449) Thus, expressions which bring together Islam
and the Republic Day holiday ought to be observed as an indicator of the instances
where Islamism and nationalism coincide in the rhetoric of Zaman.  As will be
mentioned in the subsection about the headscarf question, the consideration of
Anıtkabir as a place where the grave of Atatürk is and not as a  place of the ‘nation’
also shows the difference of Zaman  from Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet. Moreover, there
are instances mentioned before where Zaman has included the information about
people who have visited the graves of the martyrs in the Republic Day holiday,
which is again not seen in the other two newspapers.
In other words, the theme that has been dominant in the rhetoric of Zaman in
the representation of the Republic Day holiday has been the compatibility of
Republican regimes with Islam. This notion also addresses the will on the part of the
Islamist circle to be considered as part of the national imaginary without leaving
their religious affiliations behind.  That is Zaman  stresses that religious affiliations
are not an obstacle to engage in Republic Day holiday celebrations, which means that
being religiously conservative is not an obstacle to belong to the national imaginary
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4.1.2 Hürriyet
Hürriyet is taken as a newspaper whose ideological position is on the center.
Moreover, when compared to Zaman and Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet appears to be the
newspaper which is the less intellectual and whose ideological position is most
hidden. This study has chosen Hürriyet since it is a representative of ‘common way
of looking to things’ even if it contains ideological positions in it.  In representing the
Republic Day holiday celebrations, the themes that Hürriyet includes in the symbolic
repertoire are; first an emphasis on the progresses that the Turkish nation has
achieved especially in the field of economy and second an optimistic approach which
emphasizes the Republic Day holiday as an opportunity to manage the tensions in the
society.
According to Bora, the ideological position Hürriyet represents, is closely tied
with liberal neonationalism. Bora defines liberal neonationalism as: “a discourse that
interprets modernization using the ideology of economics, and that emphasizes the
progressivist - developmentalist aspect of the process of modernization.”(Bora, 2002:
440) Thus, this nationalistic discourse can be seen as an offspring of the Kemalist
nationalist vein, with the emphasis given to modernization and progress, the first face
of the Kemalist construction of national identity, which has been outlined in the third
chapter. The emphasis given to the field of economy can also be seen from the
statements of some columnists who write about the formation of the Republic in their
articles written for the Republic Day holiday. For example; Uluengin states that
“Mustafa Kemal has pointed in the 1923 İzmir Economy Congress that new Turkey
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has chosen the route of economic liberalism of democracies.”12 Similarly, when
talking about the popularity of the 10th year march, Çölaşan stresses that: “the war
that we have won in 10 years was a war of economy”, by war of economy he points
the formation of sugar and textile factories, and the construction of railways.13 These
two instances reveal the importance given to economic development in the national
imaginary by the nationalistic discourse that Hürriyet is argued to be a representative
of.
In explaining this neonationalist liberal circle, Bora also incorporates the
perspective of Özkök, the editor-in chief of Hürriyet in his analysis of this
nationalistic discourse. In relation to this study’s focus, the Republic Day holiday,
the attitude of Hürriyet to the holiday can be understood in relation to Bora’s account
in which he argues that Özkök preaches a “civil” entertaining, national self-
confidence that appeals to everyday life, and which has no truck with “gray colors,
grave speeches or politics.” (Bora, 2002: 444) This attitude towards ‘national
identity’ is also evident from the representation of the Republic Day holidays by
Hürriyet and this is the second distinguishing theme of the representation of the
Republic Day holiday by Hürriyet.  That is, the entertaining nature of the Republic
Day holiday is emphasized more often in Hürriyet when compared to the other two
newspapers. The following anecdote : “When we get to the square we understood
that seriousness did not change the celebration atmosphere, the Turkish nation was
having fun just as it wishes.” 14 shows the emphasis made on the entertaining and
civic nature of the holidays, which has been a shared view of the Hürriyet
columnists.
                                                
12 Uluengin, Hadi. Hürriyet, 29 October 1998.
13 Çölaşan, Emin. “Yeniden Onuncu Yıl” in Hürriyet,  28 October 1998.
14 Berberoğlu,  Enis. Hürriyet, 30 October 1998.
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In other words, the themes that have been dominant in the representation of
the Republic Day holiday by Hürriyet have been an emphasis on the economic
development that the nation has achieved and moreover the emphasis on the
entertaining nature of holidays which entails an optimistic future for the nation even
if various problems persist.
4.1.3 Cumhuriyet
Cumhuriyet can be classified as the newspaper that most easily fits into the
classification of Bora. Cumhuriyet is the bone of the Kemalist nationalism which
Bora (2003:439) defines as being a left-wing discourse, in which the motifs of anti-
imperialism, independence and secularism has occupied its agenda in late 90’s and
early 2000’s. This perspective on national imagination and identity is also evident in
the way Cumhuriyet presents the Republic Day holiday. Moreover, the anti-
imperialistic character of the regime can be said to be emphasized only by
Cumhuriyet in the articles of the columnists, who argue that the day of the foundation
of the Republic should be considered as the day when the anti-imperialistic stance of
the ‘nation’ began. Generally, the stance of Cumhuriyet towards the Republic Day
holiday can be said to be a view emphasizing how seriously the holiday ought to be
taken into account. Another point of the Cumhuriyet newspapers` representation of
the Republic Day holiday, is that Cumhuriyet columnists mostly advise readers to
take the Republic Day holiday as a day that should be both entertaining and both
thoughtfully handled, in the sense that the history of the Republic should be looked at
and understood, for the ‘nation’ to be ready for the future.
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Another theme that has been dominant in the symbolic repertoire of
Cumhuriyet has been the emphasis made on ‘secularism’. This emphasis is stressed
by columnists arguing: “Republic means laicism before everything else.”15, “laicism
is an inseparable part of a Republican regime”16. The emphasis on the secular
character of the state in Cumhuriyet corresponds to the same amount of emphasis
being made on the democratic nature of the regime in Zaman. Thus, a republic versus
democracy discussion can be observed in the articles of the columnists of these two
newspapers, in which the concepts are defined not exactly different but the regime is
presented as either ‘needing-more-democracy’ or ‘needing-more-secularism’. Here
again, the Republic Day holiday is seen as a medium through which different
interpretations of the ‘state’ can be expressed. Here it is worth to remember that the
reference to the state implies a reference to the nation.
Thus the themes that have been dominant in the representation of the republic
Day holiday by Cumhuriyet are the references made to the anti-imperialistic and
secular character of the regime. As it’s seen the Republic Day holiday is utilized by
Cumhuriyet as a medium to express directly the thoughts about the characteristics for
the regime and in this sense, in its attitude towards the Republic Day holiday
Cumhuriyet not only differs from Zaman but is also different from Hürriyet in the
serious mood it considers the Republic Day holiday.
In sum, the newspapers` different attitudes towards the republic with the
different common themes that they use in their evaluation of the importance of the
day highlight the ways in which the Republic Day holiday is open to interpretation
                                                
15 Bursalı, Orhan. “Perşembe” in Cumhuriyet,  29 October 1998.
16 Ertuğrul, Erol.  “Yarın Cumhuriyeti İlân Edeceğiz” in Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1999.
96
by different circles. That is, different nationalistic circles emphasize the different
aspects of the Republic Day holiday so that, every circle constructs another
interpretation of the holiday, leading to a different interpretation of the ‘nation’, the
‘state’ and the ‘regime’.
After exploring the themes that the three newspapers include in the symbolic
repertoire of the national imaginary via their representation of the celebrations of the
Republic Day Holidays, now the two lines of analysis that has been mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter would be made. Through these two dimensions and three
focuses under each dimension this study aims to provide a detailed picture of the
experience of the Republic Day Holidays in the post-1997 period.
4.2 REPUBLIC DAY HOLIDAY: RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL
IMAGINARY
In the second chapter, commemorative activity was introduced as a sphere, an
activity that forms one of the many faces of the national imagination. Whether in the
initial founding period of a nation-state or in the contemporary period, nearly all
nation-states have celebratory events which address the special meanings attached to
national identity in each and every nation. The themes which are proposed in the
commemorations might be different in different nation-states; such as `freedom in
the case of United States (Spillman, 1997), or military power in the case of Israel
(Mayar, 2000). There are of course differences in the web of meanings that can de
derived from the analysis of commemorative activities in different nation-states, but
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still it is reasonable to argue that the logic of national imagination in different nations
have some commonalties.
Although there are various functions of commemorative activity in the service of
national imagination this study restricts itself to three functions which has been
outlined in the second chapter. These functions are as follows. First, commemorative
activity serves the national imagination with the emphasis on the simultaneity of the
‘nation’ across time and across geographical locations. Second, commemorative
activity is a sort of invented tradition and thus serves in the institutionalization of
‘the nation’ as an imagined community. This characteristic of commemorative
activity as sort of an invented tradition, operates through the endorsement of some
nation-specific symbols such as national flags and anthems, and functions moreover
as a site for the reinvention of traditions by which the individuals resituate the
meanings, belongings which they develop in relation to the imagination of the nation
and the corresponding national identity. Third, commemorative activity is by its
definition the site where the link between memory and identity is mutually
reconstructed. Remembrance of the same event by any group of people implied a
collectivity, which in our case is the Turkish nation. Therefore in this section these
three functions of the Republic Day holiday as a commemorative activity will be
examined. Although this section is designed to analyze the clichés of
commemorative activities, still there will be significant attention paid to the
contestations between Islamist and Secularists groups in their struggle to attach
meaning to the imagination of the ’nation’ through the medium of the Republic Day
holiday, approach to the nation.
98
4.2.1 Imagined community
In this subsection, the representations of Republic Day holidays will be analyzed
to see the ways in which the ordinary features of the news articles concerning the
celebrations include underlying assumptions about national imagination and include
messages which serve to the construction of the national imaginary. It is evident that
Anderson’s notion of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ which addresses the
centrality of image in creating a national reality is the theoretical framework in mind.
As has been explained in the second chapter, Anderson stresses the imagined
aspects of the conceptualization of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’. The role
newspapers play in developing a ‘national language’ and consequently a ‘national
identity’ has been pointed out previously. To restate once more, Andersons argues
that the circulation of newspapers are crucial in the narration of a nation. Similarly,
the analysis of the newspapers revealed that the Republic Day holidays were utilized
as a proper site to enable and foster  national imagination, which were presented as if
the ‘nation-as-one’ was participating in the celebrations. Within this context, two
major points will be elaborated on. First it will be argued that the provision of lists of
the celebrations of Republic Day holidays in each city acquires a deeper meaning
because this provision relates to the imaginary of the nation as limited in territory.
Second the emphasis on the crowdedness of the celebrations will be interpreted in
relation to Anderson`s conceptualization of the `nation` as an imagined community.
These two characteristics of the presentation of Republic Day holidays in Turkey are
argued to be routes that the national imaginary use in the aim to reinstitutionalize the
‘nation’ as limited and sovereign.
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4.2.1.1 Cities
In line with this argument, first the provision of the cities that have participated in
the Republic Day holiday celebrations will be analyzed. Although the presentation of
different activities in the different cities of Turkey is not a recently invented tradition
and can also be found in the early years of the Republic, here the point is that the
presentation of special information about the celebrations in different cities provides
meaning to the nation, since it leads to the imagination of the nation by providing a
simultaneity-across-place. This conceptualization of the nation as providing
simultaneity-across place among the members of the nation, stresses the unitary
nature of the state, by implying that all the cities in the country have employed
similar means to celebrate the founding day of the republic.  This section in the
newspaper is generally similar to the ones in the early years of the Republic; even
though the expression might change, the format is the same. This format is the
explanation of what activity is being held in which city, and the presentation of
information includes all cities which are holding an activity for the celebration of the
Republic Day holiday. Here, it is interesting to note that, this presentation of
information about cities who have participated in the Republic Day holiday through
the various activities they had held (such as official ceremonies, balls or torchlight
processions) especially hold place in Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet, whereas Zaman  does
not present the celebrative activities around the country the same way as the other
two newspapers do.  The reason for the difference in the absence/presence of
information stems from the difference in the nationalistic discourses these
newspapers represent.
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By the presentation of information about the ways in which the Republic Day
has been celebrated in various cities an imagination of the ‘nation’ becomes possible.
This imagination provides a closure to the geographical place of the nation, and at
the same time the readers of the newspaper have the possibility to imagine their
fellow citizens participating in similar activities across the country. Moreover, with
the provision of the list of cities those have participated in the celebrative activities,
the power of the state as being able to reach each and every town across the country
is strengthened. When considered in association to the from-above characteristic of
the Turkish nationalist project, it can be argued that these celebrations were held in
the initial years of the Republic with the leadership of state elites. In the proceeding
decades the celebration of the Republic Day holiday has become a tradition and in
the years studied by this thesis, the institutionalization of this tradition was so
obvious that it can not be argued that it was invented at any point of time in history.
Thus, these lists provided in especially Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet can be thought in
the broader framework of the nationalist imaginary, supporting the notion that the
`nation-as-one`, as a community is showing its devotedness to the nation, to the state
by its participation in the celebrative activities.
This thesis argues that the provision of a list of cities that have participated in
the Republic Day celebrations serves for the feeling of ‘belonging to a crowd’ to
reach the readers of the newspapers, the ‘conationals’. With this information, the
readers became aware of the number of people in various cities who have celebrated
the holiday just as they have done. That is this information should be treated as an
information about the places where Turkish people are aware of their nationality. In
that sense, the provision of information about the territories that have celebrated the
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Republic Day holiday in some cases include the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic
or the Turkic Republics, and even in the embassies in other countries. This
information implies that nationhood is not just bound by territory, but that is a
‘given’ carried together with the national citizen even in other countries. Thus the
sense of ‘we’ versus ‘other’ is strengthened and sustained by a cliché the newspapers
use in informing their readers about the Republic Day holiday.
4.2.1.2 Crowdedness
In accordance with the presentation of different cities’ activities to celebrate
the Republic Day holiday, second the presentation of information about the ways, in
which the celebrations had been crowded, deserves attention. The previous
subsection argued how the provision of lists of cities participating in the Republic
Day holiday celebrations implied the sense of ‘togetherness’ to the readers of the
newspapers. Departing from the statement of Kucmanovic (1996:104):  “Even when
nationalists are not, in fact, objectively in a crowd, they experience themselves as
part of a crowd. ... Nationalism is, so to say, a metaphor of mass ”, the information
provided by the newspapers about the degree of crowdedness of the celebrations are
argued to be supporters for the sense of national belonging that relies upon the
membership to a mass. Thus, the basic feature of the Republic Day holiday in which
‘people participate enthusiastically and in great numbers in the celebrations in all the
cities of the country’ is a supportive representation of the national imaginary, the
national imaginary which views the nation-as-this and the people-as-one. This
presentation affects the reader by the sense of ‘togetherness’ it entails. That is the
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crowdedness of the celebrations is a metaphor for the feeling of belonging to a mass
in any nationalistic discourse. Kucmanovic(1996:104-107) argues that this feeling of
togetherness with ‘conationals’ is an indispensable feature of nationalism and has
features such as : the feeling of power, the lowering of mental abilities,  the
intensification of emotional reactions, the surfacing of the unconscious,
deindividuation and equality within the group. All these features serve to the
imagination of the national community and these features are supported by the
newspapers by implying again on again on the crowdedness of the celebrations.
Here a distinguishing feature of the post-1997 period should be taken into
consideration regarding the crowdedness of the celebrations. Whether this crowd was
in a concert, in a ball, in a stadium celebration or in Anıtkabir, it ought to be
considered as a metaphor utilized in emphasizing the mass phenomenon of
nationalism. However there ought to be another reading of the emphasis on
crowdedness. As has been mentioned before, “for the secularists and Atatürkists
groups, the 1990s have been marked by the presence of the ‘Islamic threat’.” (Yazıcı,
2001:5)  This perception of an Islamic threat was at its peak, especially in the
immediate aftermath of the 28th February process. Accordingly, the 1997, 1998 and
to some extent in the 1999 celebration, the ‘crowdedness’ of the celebrations was
emphasized more in the newspapers when compared to the following years. Among
many other themes that the secularist and Atatürkists utilized in the face of a
perceived Islamic threat, this thesis argues that crowdedness of the organized
activities was a central feature of the secularist discourse. The secularists and
Atatürkists not only organized activities in the Republic Day holiday in years 1997
and 1998, actually there had been a high degree of activities organized in the ‘face of
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an Islamic threat’ in these years. However, the Republic Day holiday and especially
the 75th year of anniversary of the Republic on year 1998 provided an opportunity to
be utilized in the perception of an Islamic threat.
In this conjuncture, the emphasis made on the ‘crowdedness’ of the
celebrations and organizations for the 75th Anniversary of the Republic provided a
feeling of power to the Atatürkist and secularist groups. By reasoning from the
‘crowdedness’ of the celebrations, these groups argued that the ‘nation’ was
altogether struggling against the Islamic threat. That is, the crowdedness of the
celebrations was attributed to a certain nationalistic discourse, which was deemed to
be the only nationalistic discourse. In other words, crowdedness of the celebrations
of Republic Day holidays provided a ground by which a certain nationalistic
discourse draws a framework of inclusion and exclusion in the name of the nation.
Thus, this subsection argues that in especially the immediate aftermath of the
28th February process the crowdedness of the celebrations were presented as a notion
addressing the nation, whereas it could also be argued that the participation in the
celebrations were a notion belonging to a certain nationalistic discourse. In fact, the
theme of crowdedness has been a major component of the imaginary of the nation
and the crowdedness of commemorations has always been a metaphor used to
address the mass phenomenon of national imagination. In each case, this thesis
argues that crowdedness has been used as a metaphor to address ‘national belonging’
with feelings of power and equality within the group being influential themes in
sustaining the national imaginary.
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In this section, the ways in which the ordinary features of the representation
of the Republic Day holiday can serve to the continuation of a national imaginary has
been explained, with emphasis on the crowdedness of the celebrations and the
provision of lists of cities that have participated in the celebrations. In the next
section, the traditions that were invented and renovated in the post-1997 period will
be examined in relation to the continuity of the national imagination and in the
context of the Islamist threat perceived by the secularist elites.
4.2.2 Invented and Renovated Traditions
 The construction of Turkish national imagination includes a series of
invented traditions, through which the ‘modern’ way of life has been presented to the
citizens of the state.   In the context of the Republic Day holidays, the republican
balls were a common practice in the initial years of the Republic, alongside the
torchlight processions. In the post-1997 period, we can also observe the existence of
these invented traditions. It is not argued that these two activities have maintained
the same popularity throughout the years since the early Republican period, since this
study does not aim to provide such a comparative perspective of Republic Day
holidays. However, it is worth mentioning that, at least some of the balls are recently
revitalized, e.g. Cumhuriyet counts the ball that was arranged in Armada hotel,
Istanbul among the celebrations held for the Republic Day Holiday and writes:  “The
Armada Hotel, has arranged these balls since 1994 to revitalize the balls which were
a common practice in the early years of the Republic.”17 The date of the move to
                                                
17Cumhuriyet, 31 October 2002.
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revitalize these balls coincides with the date when the Welfare Party won the
municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul. Just like the revitalization of the tradition of
balls, torchlight processions also began to be held again in the Republic Day holiday
after 1994. The significance of the year 1994 goes beyond the scope of this study, but
still in the period of focus of this study, there are a number of instances where both a
ball was held and a torchlight procession was carried out by a municipality or a civil
society organization. These activities which began to be arranged in the celebrations
of the Republic Day holiday reveal how ‘traditions’ can be returned to, even if their
existence was forgotten for a time.
Regarding the balls, there is another point that should be noted. The news
about the balls that have been organized has found more place in the Cumhuriyet
newspaper. Hürriyet hardly mentions these balls, whereas Zaman  has not had a
single news article about any ball throughout 1997 to 2003. It is interesting that,
Cumhuriyet even informs its readers the first republican ball organized in Çıldır, a
district of Ardahan as a success18; Zaman does not mention any balls that have been
organized not in a small town, even a ball organized in Ankara or Istanbul. For
example, on year 1997 a Republican ball was organized in Ankara, Kızılay by the
Republican People’s Party. Whereas Hürriyet presents this as if there were enormous
participation in the ball19, on the other hand Zaman does not inform its readers about
this event. The absence/presence of information of the balls certainly addresses the
political position of these newspapers given the political conjuncture in the aftermath
of the 28th February process. In especially years 1997 and 1998, these balls were
                                                
18 Cumhuriyet, 01 November 2003
19 Hürriyet, 30 October 1997.
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presented by Cumhuriyet and to some extent by Hürriyet, as ‘people claiming the
Republic’.
That is these balls and torchlight processions were taken as a sign of ‘the
people’ expressing their distaste with the rise of Islamism. As it will be explained
more on the section about the state vs. society discourse, the revitalization of the
traditions of balls and torchlight processions were presented by Cumhuriyet and
Hürriyet as the society becoming aware of their satisfaction in the regime. This
satisfaction in the regime was noticed because of the threat they confronted by the
rise of Islamism. However, these balls and torchlight procession were not
spontaneous as much as they were presented to be. That is there were always an actor
who initiated these balls; such as the Istanbul Body of Lawyers, 20 Samsun
Governorship21 or the Republican Women’s Association.22 Even if the actor who
organized the ball has not directly been a member of the state elite, still these balls
can not be argued to be a spontaneous and voluntary that is has been presented by
Cumhuriyet.
Besides, the revitalized traditions of balls and torchlight processions in the
post-1997 period, there have also been purely invented traditions such as marches
and concerts. The most recent invention for the Republic Day holidays can be said to
be the Republic marches and concerts which have been on the scene since 1994. The
introduction of the Republic marches into the celebratory activities can be considered
within a broader change in the way the Republic Day holidays have began to be
celebrated. It can be argued that, concerts and marches leave a greater space for ‘the
                                                
20 Cumhuriyet,  26 October 1998
21 Cumhuriyet, 31 October 1998
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people’ to participate and feel themselves as participating in the holiday,  rather than
watching the holiday which is being celebrated by the state. This is the ways in
which these two activities, marches and concerts, which were in fact new, became a
tradition inserted into the experience of Republic Day holidays in the post-1997
period.
This thesis argues that; the invention of the traditions of marches and concerts
are part of the attempt of the secularist elites to incorporate the civil society rhetoric
onto their discourse. For this purpose marches and concerts were introduced as part
of the protest that was argued to be reasoning from below in the face of the rise of
Islamism. Here, the point is not why or by whom these traditions were invented,
initiated or institutionalized, but that the invention of these traditions was made via
the Republic Day holiday. That is the “return to Kemalism” became evident by the
invention of these traditions. Therefore in this period, especially in the years
proceeding the 28th February process, the Republic Day holiday has gone through a
series of changes which have included both a return to the past with the revitalization
of balls and torchlight processions and the invention of new traditions for the
celebration of the holiday, such as marches and concerts. Although the experience of
marches and concerts are mostly carried out by official nationalism which has been
explained in the third chapter by using Bora’s classification of nationalistic
discourses, they were mostly presented as if they represented the whole nation, and
this notion represents the ways in which the activities associated with the Republic
Day Holiday take on themselves a meaning about and of ‘the nation’ and national
imaginary.
                                                                                                                                         
22 Cumhuriyet,  26 October 2003
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Moreover, it is interesting to note that, the participation of the masses in the
marches is accompanied by some shouted slogans such as; “Turkey is laic and will
remain laic! Turkey is proud of you! Atatürk will not die, the motherland will not be
divided”23, “We are young, we are strong, we are Atatürkist!”24, “Atatürkists are
here, where are the gangs?”25, “Our names are different, our surname is Turkey.”26
Similarly, these marches were marked by titles such as: “We are walking, we are
celebrating”27, “The Republican chain”28, “You too carry a torch”29 “Hand in hand
for the Republican Youth”30. All these slogans implied some concepts that were
thought to be crucial for the national imaginary. `Hand in hand` ness stresses equality
and togetherness among the members of the nation in any confrontation with an
exterior or interior enemy. `You too carry a torch` includes an invitation to
participate in the march, which means an invitation to show performance for the
cause of the nation.  `Our names are different; our surname is Turkey` implies a
solution for the dilemma of citizenship which has been explained in the second
chapter. This solution places the belonging of a citizen to his/her state above ethnic
or religious belongings.
 These names of the marches and the slogans that were shouted during them
can not be considered as representing all the people, nor as if the whole nation was
sharing the position of those who participated in these marches, however these
                                                
23 “ Cumhuriyete 75 Altın Gul”, Cumhuriyet, 30 October 1998.
24 “79. yil coskusu”, Cumhuriyet, 30 October 2002.
25 “Bayram Neşesi”, Hürriyet, 30 October 1997.
26 “Cumhuriyet Çoskusu”, Hürriyet, 30 October 1997.
27 “Cumhuriyet Çoskusu” Hurriyet, 28 October 2002.
28 “Üç Nesil Bir Arada” Hürriyet, 30 October  1997.
29 “İstanbul’da 29 Ekim”, Cumhuriyet, 30 October 2000.
30 “İstanbul’da 29 Ekim” Cumhuriyet, 30 October 2000.
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marches and concerts were represented in the newspapers as if they were
representing the whole of the nation. Still it is reasonable to argue that these marches
and concerts were a medium for expressing the position and attitude of some of the
people who constituted the nation together with the other groups. The group that
claimed to be representing the whole nation was undoubtedly the secularists and
Atatürkists groups, which have been argued to be using the Republic Day holiday as
a medium for the purpose of expressing their unease with the rise of Islamism That is
these marches and concerts organized in the Republic Day holidays are mostly
argued to be a reaction to the rise of Islamism, and that this reaction has been
initialized by civil society organizations. My aim here is not to examine the ways in
which these marches and concerts were organized as a reaction to the rise of
Islamism, although this might be a plausible argument to be explored in another
study.
This subsection presented that in the post-1997 period, the Republic Day
holiday celebrations saw both inventions of new traditions, such as marches and
concerts; and both the revitalization of the traditions of the early republican period:
such as balls and torchlight processions. These inventions of traditions are partly
serving to the continuation of the national imaginary. However these inventions of
traditions ought to be thought not only in the framework of the nationalist imaginary,
but also in relation to the threat perceived by the secularist elites with the rise of
Islamism. In the scope of this study, the interesting point is how these marches,
concerts and balls started to be included as part of  the way by which the Republic
Day holiday is celebrated. The Republic Day holiday celebrations came to be thought
as inseparable from marches, concerts and balls.
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Especially the balls which have been explained above have been used as a
tool to link the past to the present. In the next section, the ways in which the ‘past’ is
inserted into the practices of the Republic Day holiday will be analyzed in more
detail.
4.2.3 ‘Past’ According to a Present Agenda
National history and national identity are inevitably linked such that “national
ideologies present national consciousness as a discovery of historical consciousness.”
(Yazıcı, 2001: 4) Similarly the ways in which the past is referred to constitute a
central part of national imagination and national identity. The significance of the
‘past’ and the remembrance of the past have been analyzed in the second chapter
with references to Gillis, who argues that remembrances of the past and references to
the past always involve choices, choices that are affected by the present conditions.
Therefore in any study concerning references to the past it is important to clarify
what exactly is remembered, by which group of the society, when and for what
purpose.
In the context of the Republic Day holiday, the reference to the past is so natural
since the idea of a founding moment lies at the core of the celebrative activities. The
Republic Day holiday, thus, by definition involves a reference to the past by creating
an awareness of the time of the nation. This time-awareness reasons since that the
Republic Day holiday, as any holiday addressing the founding moment of a nation-
state does, resembles the birthday of the nation and the nation-state. In that sense, the
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Republic Day holiday contains the idea of celebrating the very moment when the
history of the nation began, a point where the nation was inserted into history.
Thus, the Republic Day holiday is in it a remembrance of the past and the
reference to the past is made via an emphasis on the founding moment of the nation-
state. Spillman (1997:113) argues that the idea of a founding moment is a central
theme to be utilized in introducing other topics concerning national imaginary.  In
that sense, the Republic Day holiday is mostly celebrated by referring first to the
moment when the Turkish Republic was founded. The Republic Day holiday is
consequently utilized by the newspaper columnists and by the celebrative activities
as an opportunity where the history of the ‘nation’ can be remembered, expressed
and reconfigured. The link with the past generations is in accordance with
Anderson’s notion of horizontal time; a conception of time through which the nation
has moved gradually is expressed via the celebration of the Republic Day holiday
each and every year. The gesture to the past provides a link between the current
citizens of the state and the previous citizens of the state who have always come
together in the celebrations to show their belongingness to the nation and their share
in the national imagination. However in this expression the difference between the
past and present citizens of the state is blurred and the togetherness of the national
subject is implied. Despite differences in the style of reference to the past in different
newspapers, the common point is that the mentioning of the past in the celebrations
of the Republic Day holidays involves an underlying emphasis on the nation as a
homogenous entity which has moved through the history of the nation; that is, since
1923, the declaration of the Republic, the people of the nation (we) have been
celebrating the founding moment of their (our) state on each 29 October.
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In other words, this thesis argues that the reference made to the ‘founding
moment’ of the nation, is an inclusive trait of the national imagination. Even if
different nationalistic groups propose different features of the moment when the
nation was inserted into history, “In any case, there is always an enemy from which
the ‘nation’ is saved, at the ‘founding moment’, by the ‘founders’, for the
‘people’.”(Çınar, 2001: 369) The Islamist circle might label the enemy armies in
Anatolia which the National Liberation War was fought against, as the enemies of
the nation; whereas the secularists might label the Ottoman dynasty as the real enemy
against which the National Liberation war has been won; still, these two perspectives
do not actually conceal the fact that the idea of a founding moment ought to be read
as a limitation to national imagination, national identity and national history. In that
sense, different nationalistic discourses might refer to the founding moment of the
nation in the context of the Republic Day holiday by emphasizing different aspects of
the nation in accordance with differences in their national imaginary, however still
the reference to national history via the Republic Day entails a time-awareness about
the ‘nation’ on behalf of these different groups.
However the reference to past has not only brought an inclusive trait to the
national imaginary in the post-1997 period. Although the celebrations of Republic
Day holidays were of the ‘nation’ still they were claimed more by the secularist
groups. Actually the past has been a highly debated issue in this period, especially
between secularists and Islamists.  Moreover, the invocation of history by contending
forces has led history to become a terrain of contestation, a terrain where these forces
resist, assert and bargain for their imagination of the nation. (Yazıcı, 2001:10) This
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thesis argues that the contestation for the drawing of the boundaries of the national
imagination between secularist and Islamists groups by referencing to the past, has
not been made via directly using the character of the Republic Day as a founding
moment, but through the reflections made through the contestation between the 10th
anniversary of the Republic and by the Ottoman Day (May 29). That is while
secularists and Islamists accept (or at least seem to accept) the importance of 29
October 1923 for the Turkish national imaginary, the difference in their national
imaginary can be observed from the introduction of the Ottoman Day by the
Islamists and the emphasis made on the 10th anniversary of the Republic by the
secularists. In order to explain this contestation between Ottoman Day and the 10th
anniversary of the Republic, first the inscription of the Ottoman Day by the Islamists
as a day worth to be celebrated, will be explained.
The May 29 celebrations refer to the conquest of Istanbul by Fatih Sultan
Mehmet in 1453. Çınar (2001: 388) argues that: “May 29 celebrations, which were
widely celebrated by Islamist circles between 1994 and 1997, have been instrumental
in the performance of an alternative national identity and the construction of an
alternative national time that challenges official secular national history.”  The
celebration of the Ottoman Day involved an emphasis on an Ottoman-Islamic
identity, which is presented as being continuous through history, but interrupted by
the secular time of the Republic. Therefore, the Ottoman Day was a challenge to the
Kemalist nationalist project, which was constructed by a certain distance to the
Ottoman past and the associated backwardness. The celebrations of Ottoman Day
were not widely held in the post-1997 period, although the Mehter Band
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presentations have become a tradition invented via these celebrations and can still be
observed.
It can be argued that the intensity of the Republic Day holidays especially in
year s 1997 and 1998 correspond to the popularity of Ottoman Day celebrations
before the 28th February process, however this thesis carries this argument further
and argues that the secularist groups especially referred to the 10th anniversary of the
Republic while still “the secular state recognized May 29 as a day of historical
significance.” (Çınar, 2001: 387) In other words, this thesis argues that the secularist
groups especially referred to the 10th anniversary of the Republic, to emphasize a
difference in the national imaginary in contrast to the imaginary that was implied by
the Ottoman day.
       The argument is made since the analysis of the newspapers; reveal a high
occurrence of references to the 10th anniversary of the Republic as frequent as
references to 1923, the year of the declaration of the Republic.  The significance of
the 10th year of the Republic in the representation of Republic Day holidays has been
accompanied by the revitalization of the 10th year march which was remixed by
Kenan Doğulu, a famous pop singer. The reason why the 10th anniversary of the
Republic is referred this frequently many years after its celebrations are, first of all as
Öztürkmen (2001: 55) argues, because it was seen as a model celebration for the
Republic Day holiday.
However, not only the 10th year march was so popular since that the 10th year
celebration was taken as a model celebration.  When considered in the political
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conjuncture of the post-1997 period, especially in the first years, the 10th year march
was utilized as a symbol in the symbolic repertoire of the Turkish national
imaginary. The 10th year march was the symbol of Kemalism; it was a medium for
expressing the discomfort for the rise of Islamism in this period. The message given
by the popular use of the 10th year march was entailing to compare the 10th year of
the Republic and say the 75th year of the Republic. That is the 10th year both
provided a sign to show the happiness the nation felt because of belonging to such a
Republic, but it also meant that the nation ought to compare the 10th year of the
Republic and the 75th year of the Republic. The popularity of the 10th year march was
approached by some columnists suspiciously, for example: ‘The celebration ended
with the 10th year march. What have we done since the 10th year of the Republic?
What have we been able to add on in the remaining 67 years?’31 Whether with
suspicion or with joyfulness, the 10th year resembled the successes of the Kemalist
project of nationalism, especially it referred to the reforms that have been initiated
for modernizing the nation.
Thus, whilst the reference to the 10th year of the Republic entailed an
emphasis on the Kemalist conceptualization of the nation, the reference to the
Ottoman Day entailed a national imagination which included Islam as a religion.
Whereas the Ottoman Day constituted the national imaginary as being older than the
secular Republican regime and as being highly related to Islam, the usage of the 10th
year march meant an emphasis on the secular nature of the Republic and the aim to
modernize the nation.
                                                
31 Sirmen, Ali. “Dunyada Bugün” in Cumhuriyet, 31 October 2000.
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The same difference is apparent in the way the Republic Day holiday is
celebrated. In the post-1997 period, Islamist groups also began to celebrate the
Republic Day holiday. However, they celebrated it via the use of the Mehter Band
presentations, whilst the secularists celebrated it via singing the 10th year march. On
the part of the Islamists, celebrating the Republic Day holiday was an expression of
the desire to be included in the national imaginary, however when associations of
Islamist parties or deputies from those parties sang the 10th year march it was
presented as a news worth to inform the readers of the newspapers.  The 10th year
march was symbolized against the rise of Islamism, and as a Zaman  author
Ayvazoğlu argues: it was used as a symbol of republicanists, and anyone who did not
stood up and sang the march was labeled as an enemy of the Republican regime.32
At first sight, the Republic Day holiday with a Mehter Band presentation and
the Republic Day holiday referring to the 10th year of the Republic seem to be at
opposite corners, but it should not be forgotten that they are both attempts to form an
identity according to a present agenda by utilizing the ‘past’.  Yazıcı (2001: 11)
similarly points out: “While claims for the present are contested in relation to the
past between secularists and Islamists, one point seems to lie outside contestation:
the nation and the nation-state as legitimate referents, however differently they may
be imagined by the two social groups.” That is, neither the Islamists nor the
secularists have been different from each other in the way they legitimize their
present activities by utilizing the past, that is, they have both attempted to legitimize
their presence by referring basing their arguments within the imaginary terrain of the
nation and nation-state.
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In this subsection, the ways by which the past is referred to by secularists and
Islamists in the context of the Republic Day holiday have been discussed. This thesis
argues that although the Republic Day holiday was in some cases including a point
of contestation between these two groups, it should be considered as a shared point in
history since it addresses the founding moment of the nation-state and even if there
may be different ways of referring to it, still any reference to the founding moment
ought to be read as a reading of the nation. The negative or positive attitude towards
the past of the republic, the past of the nation, does not deny the fact that the
republic, the nation, the state has a past, a history which might be understood
independently from the past of the groups within the national community. However,
the reference to the past is still in accordance to the present agendas of Islamists and
secularists groups, and this thesis argues that this difference in the interpretation of
national imaginary is expressed via the usage of the Mehter Band presentation or the
10th year march. It is interesting that the usage of these two symbols are not only
restrained to the peak of contestation between Islamist and secularists groups, that is
the immediate aftermath of the 28th February process, but in the consequent years
they are used to express the difference in referring to the past by different
nationalistic discourses. Therefore, in this subsection, this thesis argued that the
‘past’ has been both a point of inclusion and a matter of contestation between
nationalistic discourses, especially between Islamist and secularist groups in the post-
1997 period. That is while the Republic Day holiday was inclusive, the manner in
which it is celebrated –whether with a 10th year march or with a Mehter band
presentation- remained a feature to differentiate nationalistic discourses.
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This section has explained the ways in which a commemorative activity, the
Republic Day holiday, can be studied as an embodiment of the national imagination
through three notions: first, the ways in which the commemorative activity serves in
the imagination of the nation; second, the ways in which traditions are invented and
renovated to support various ways of this imagination; and third, the ways in which
the past is incorporated in current celebrations. In these three notions, the argument
has been that the Republic Day holiday is a dynamic point, which can serve as a
symbol for the terrain of Turkish national imaginary. In this section, the
inclusiveness of the Republic Day holiday has been emphasized, although in some
cases it has been a point of contestation between secularists and Islamists. In the next
section, the Republic Day holiday will be analyzed from a more specific perspective
in order to highlight the ways in which the Republic Day holiday has become a site
of contestation in the post-1997 period
4.3 The Republic Day Holiday in the Specificity of Turkish Politics
In the previous section, the Republic Day holiday is taken as a site where the
national imagination is embodied, fostered and strengthened through the concept of
`crowdedness`; the invention and reintroduction of traditions such as balls, torchlight
processions, marches and concerts; and through the remembrance of the `past`
according to the present conditions. Besides attempting to understand the Republic
Day holiday as an embodiment of the national imagination, this study aims to reveal
the ways in which the Republic Day holiday has both been a site of contestation,
intervention and negotiation in Turkey in the post-1997 period.
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In the previous chapter, the political atmosphere of Turkey in the post-1997
period has been explained. In this section the objective is to trace the reflections of
the political conditions in Turkey in the celebrations of the Republic Day holidays.
That is contrary to the previous section the issues that will be analyzed in this section
are not themes that can be generally found in commemorative activities. Rather it is
argued that these themes have been an issue in the Republic Day celebrations
because of certain political conditions in Turkey in the post-1997 period.
First, the participation of the military in the Republic Day holidays will be
evaluated from two perspectives, in which it is argued that in the post-1997 period
the participation of the military in Republic Day holiday celebrations can be
distinguished from the traditional role the military has played in these celebrations.
In the third chapter, the reasons behind the `headscarf` being a point of discussion in
Turkish politics throughout the 90`s has been discussed. In line with this background,
in this section, second the instances where the question of `headscarf` has occurred in
Republic Day holiday celebrations will be explained. Third, Yashin’s state versus
civil society discourse will be examined in relation to the representations of Republic
Day holidays in the newspapers, in which it will be argued that in the post-1997
period the Republic Day holiday has been used by the state elites with the objective
of incorporating the rhetoric of `civil-society organizations` onto to their discourse.
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4.3.1 The Military
In the construction of Turkish nationalism, the military occupies a central
place. The centrality of the military in the construction of Turkish nationalism has
two reasons. First, the ‘military’ has been constituted as a central part of the Turkish
nationality since it is seen as part of the civilizational progress that the Kemalist
nationalist project envisioned. The emphasis on the military-nation tradition of the
Turkish nation is tied to the importance given to the technological advancement of
the military in the nation-state era. That is, the technological advancement of the
military is seen as an indicator that sustains the place of the Turkish nation vis-à-vis
the world. Moreover, the military is seen traditionally as a “‘most trusted institution’,
and this status was based on its image of being ‘above politics’.”(Cizre and Çınar,
2003: 321) This role bestowed upon the military as being “above politics” serves to
the imagination of the military as being impersonal end eternal.  Contrary to the
traditional role of military, second, the military actually has intervened in the
political life several times throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. Even this
study’s choice of research period is affected by the 28th February process in which
the military engaged in a post-modern coup, because it envisaged a threat to the
regime from the Islamist Welfare government. Thus, in the post-1997 period the
military had a hand in the political life. But this involvement was implicit rather than
being explicit, this thesis argues that, especially, the 1998 celebrations of the
Republic Day holiday were participated by the military with political purposes and
the Republic Day holidays were thus a suitable domain for the military to express its
existence without directly involving in political matters. Now the involvements of
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the military in the celebrations of the Republic Day holiday in traditional ways and
as an implicit political act will be explained.
First, one implication of the nationalist construction that gives the military a
central place is that the Republic Day holidays contain the military in the official
celebrations. This important place given to the military can be found in the early
republican period celebrations of the Republic Day holiday. Since these early
celebrations are taken as a model for the later celebrations, this showing off of the
military personnel and equipments in the rites of passage can be seen in the
celebrative activities of the post-1997 period as well as in prior celebrations.  This
tradition of the military participating in the rites of passage is followed by the
ceremonies in the research period of this study as well. This part of the ceremony
generally includes some displays performed by the military cadets together with
shows performed by airplanes and helicopters. An example might be the Turk Stars
which consist of seven supersonic planes which engage in acrobatic performances on
Republic Day holidays and other celebrations. 33 In these celebrations there are
usually Apache and Skorsky helicopters, SAT commandos, special units such as
“Peace Power Company”, namely series of military personnel and equipments.
This symbolic dominance of the military in the celebrations is to a large
extent an outcome of the nationalist imagination. By the participation of the military
equipment and personnel in these celebrations the state shows, and consequently
assesses and strengthens its power in the face of any threat. The continuity of this
imagination is supported by the military’s existence in the celebrative activities. This
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symbolic power of military’s participation in Republic Day holiday celebrations is
labeled as Zaman as a “public demonstration”34 in 1997. Zaman emphasizes the point
that the visibility of the military in these celebrations imply power, security and an
underlying threat to ‘internal and external enemies’.  Here it is important to
emphasize that this participation of military figures in the celebrative activities does
not address the ‘military’ as the total of the existing military officials. Rather, the
military as a part of the symbolization of the nationalist construction can be thought
of as a deindividuated image addressing the military as an eternal being. The
participation of the military in the celebrative activities, signal the ‘military’ as a
homogenous entity present every moment to protect the ‘nation’. That is, the military
is included in the national imaginary and is itself imagined the same way as the
nation is imagined. The ‘nation’ is imagined as having an eternal existence and the
‘military’ is incorporated in this imagination as being part of the national imagination
and simultaneously as a protector of the nation.
Second, the military’s existence in the Republic Day holidays due to the
specificities of the post-1997 period can be seen as the military attending these
participations in line with their implicit political stance in the immediate aftermath of
the post-1997 period. That is, in the post-1997 period the military can be claimed to
have a closer relationship with the activities that have occurred in the Republic Day
holidays: a significant example would be the printed notice that the general
headquarters of the army circulated for the military personnel to participate in the
marches that the 75th year organization committee arranged. The military personnel
were advised to participate in the marches with their uniforms, which is a rare
                                                
34 Zaman, 30 October 1997.
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occurrence in Turkish political history.35 Similarly, in 1999, the general headquarters
also circulated another printed notice to the military offices in order to ensure that the
military personnel would be present in the ceremony at Anıtkabir on the day of the
holiday. These two instances, occur in the preceding two years after the 28th
February process and are significant since they reveal military’s will to show itself as
part of the nation and to show their presence in continuum with their presence in the
political scene since 1997.  In these two instances the military’s participation in the
Republic Day holiday has been presented by newspapers by titles such as: “military
and the people hand in hand”.36
Especially in the 75th anniversary of the Republic which was the immediate
aftermath of the 28th February process, the military’s presence in the Republic Day
holiday attains a different meaning than an ordinary appearance in the ceremonies
held for the holiday. This participation of the military in the celebrations and the
organizations held to celebrate the holiday are different from the traditional role the
military takes on itself in these celebrations. In this occasion, the presence of the
military does not only stand for a general threat for the enemies of the Republic, but
presents the  military as being more concerned in the developments that occur in the
political scene, namely the rise of Islamism. Bora classifies the army as the
crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state,
which has the role as the main regenerator of official nationalism. (Bora, 2003:437)
In the post-1997 period, the military also manifested its power through its increasing
interest in the Republic Day holidays, especially in the years proceeding the 28th
February process.
                                                
35 Hürriyet, 28 October 1998.
36 Cumhuriyet,  25 October 1998.
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Thus, the military’s presence in the Republic Day holiday can be read from
two perspectives: first, from  the point of view of the state, representing the military
as an eternal entity forever protecting the nation; and second, the participation of the
military in the Republic Day holidays as an implicit political act.
This subsection argues that, the above mentioned two points about the
military’s participation in the Republic Day holidays, shows that the Republic Day
holiday is seen as a stage where national identities can be expressed. Military’s
participation in the Republic Day holiday is thus in a sense an intervention, an
intervention to the drawing of the national imaginary which is embodied through the
Republic Day holiday.
Another specific occurrence that has been observed in the Republic Day
holidays in the post-1997 period and which has achieved much more interest than the
military’s increasing presence in the political scene has been the question of
‘Headscarf’, which will be explained in the next section.
4.3.2 The “Headscarf” Question
As has been argued in the third chapter, women have been bestowed upon the
role of carriers of civilization in the construction of Turkish national identity. With
the rise of the Islamist agenda in the post-1980 period, ‘women’ came to be
discussed in relation to the question of ‘headscarf’. With the increasing visibility of
‘headscarfed women’ in the public space, women began to be a point of discussion
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between Islamists and secularist intellectuals. Here, it is not aimed to offer an all
encompassing study of the question of the headscarf in the post-1997 period, but it is
desired to show the ways in which ‘woman’ and ‘headscarf’ enter into the site of the
Republic Day holidays. Thus, the ways in which ‘headscarfed women’ find or do not
find a place in the nationalist imagination can be understood by looking the instances
where this problem has coincided with the celebrative activities and their
representation in newspapers.
There are four major instances where the ‘headscarf’ question has occurred in
the context of the Republic Day holiday in the post-1997 period. First, the visibility
of the headscarfed women and students in the marches performed for the celebrations
together with their participation in the rites of passage has been an issue. Second, the
participation of imam-hatip schools in the rites of passage has achieved attention in
the representation of the Republic Day holiday celebrations in the newspapers. Third,
there has been a discussion about the ‘Regulations on outward appearance’
regarding Anıtkabir in 1999. Fourth; in 2003, the question of headscarf was
discussed largely since it led to a ‘reception crisis.’ In the analysis of all these four
occasions, the point of argument is that the ‘holiday’ is a national platform endowed
with public visibility, and thus the inclusion of ‘headscarfed women’ in the holiday
has come to mean their inclusion in the national imagination. Since the ‘nation’ is
presented as participating in the celebrations as a whole, when we look at the
photographs which occur on the first page of the newspapers, we can see a difference
in the national imagination that the newspapers present. That is, a photograph in
Cumhuriyet does not include headscarfed women, whilst a photograph in Zaman
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would include them.37 This difference in the photographs implies differences in the
national imaginations that these newspapers present as part of a certain nationalistic
discourse. By ignoring or including a headscarfed women in a photograph which is
printed to symbolize the `nation` in the front page of a newspaper, the boundaries of
the nationalist imagination is redrawn. In other words, the symbolic repertoire of
Zaman includes a `headscarfed` women, whereas Cumhuriyet ignores it. The
spectrum of inclusion/ ignorance affects the conditions of the national imaginary and
once again presents the symbolic power of `headscarf` in Turkish politics which
represents real points of antagonism. Before elaborating more on these differences,
the four occasions where the headscarf question has entered into the presentation of
Republic Day holidays will be explained.
First, the participation of ‘headscarfed women’ in the informal celebrative
activities on the Republic Day holiday deserves attention.  That is the participation of
headscarfed women in republican marches has been focused on by columnists who
have taken different attitudes towards this participation. For example, Ekşi says that
“there were women, headscarfed and uncovered women in the republican march ...
all these women are children of the Republic”38 Thus, the participation of the
headscarfed women in the marches becomes a symbol for their degree of inclusivity
in the ‘nation’, and the attitude towards their participation reveals the perspective of
the columnists, which means the reaction to the existence of headscarfed women in
the celebrations reveals the level of acceptance given to them as part of the national
imaginary.
                                                
37 Zaman, 29 October 2003; Hürriyet, 29 October 2003.
38 Ekşi, Oktay.  Hürriyet, 28 October 1998.
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Second, not only has ‘headscarfed women’s participation in the informal
marches been an issue recurring in the newspapers, but also the participation of
imam-hatip schools39 has received attention. As has been mentioned before, the
Republic Day holidays include rites of passage in which schools present themselves
in the celebrations in the stadiums. These rites of passage reflect the earlier
celebration of the Republic Day holiday in the early republican period, in which the
Republic Day holiday has been presented as the holiday of the state and thus
participants in the rites of passage were a part of the state, and society was watching
the passage of the state’s constituent parts. Thus, the holiday in this manner, was
seen as a holiday-to-be-watched, to be watched by the society. When looking at the
occurrence of the ‘headscarf’ question with regard to the Republic Day holidays, one
of the four instances regards the participation of imam-hatip schools in these rites of
passage. Here the interesting point is that the imam-hatip schools were expected to
participate in the ceremonies with the girls uncovered. Thus, while the marches were
considered as a private sphere, the ceremonies held for the Republic Day holiday
were seen as a public sphere.  This perspective shows how the public-private
distinction is inscribed into any discussion of national identity, and how certain
places and events are perceived as sites of the ‘state’ because of being defined as a
public sphere. That is, since the holiday is watched by the society, the state is
representing itself in the rites of passage, and how it is seen, that is, with or without
headscarf, becomes a question concerning national imaginary.
Third, a ‘code of dress’ was applied in 1999. The text of this printed notice
announces a ‘contemporary clothing obligation’40 for the official part of the
                                                
39 Religious High Schools.
40 “Çağdaş Kiyafet Zorunluluğu”
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ceremony at Anıtkabir. Here it is important to emphasize the special event that
happened in 1999, which is commonly referred to as the Merve Kavakçı event. On
May 2, 1999 a confrontation had taken place when Merve Kavakçi, who was elected
the previous month as a Fazilet deputy, entered the Grand National Assembly with a
head scarf. Other deputies protested by beating on desktops that Kavakçi had to leave
the parliament without taking the oath. In the wake of the incident it emerged that
following an earlier marriage to an American, Merve Kavakçi had accepted U.S.
citizenship without asking prior permission from the Turkish authorities. The Turkish
Council of Ministers seized on this technical breach of Turkish law to withdraw her
citizenship, and she became to be no longer able to represent her constituency in
parliament.41 According to Göle (2002: 178): “It was Merve Kavakci’s physical
presentation in the parliament, not her election that provoked a public dispute, a
blowup.”
The press explanation ensued by the governorship of Ankara, followed these
series of events and thus it was interpreted as a precaution to prevent a similar event
happening in Anıtkabir. It was a precaution to prevent the physical visibility of
‘headscarfed women’ in Anıtkabir. However, the wording of this press explanation
came under discussion since it could be understood as if ‘headscarfed citizens’ are
not allowed to visit Anıtkabir. But, the obligation for contemporary clothing only
referred to the official part of the ceremony: that is, the part when political party
leaders, members of the parliament, general staff and selected teachers and students
participate under the leadership of the presidency.42  Here the attribution of Anıtkabir
is important since it is seen as a public sphere of the ‘nation’, the ‘nation’ that is
                                                
41  Nicole Pope,  ‘Parliament opens amid Controversy’ TurkeyUpdate (Web publication at www.
Turkey Update.com) , 3 May 1999
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constructed by placing a certain distance between itself and religion. However, the
‘headscarf’ has been seen by the state elites as a flag of the rise of the Islamist
parties; that is, the meaning of ‘headscarf’ and its place in the national imaginary is
differentially interpreted in different circles, and this differentiation becomes mostly
a problem when a certain place  is defined as a public sphere. However, the same
point of view has not been shared by the Islamist circles that have seen the
‘headscarf’ not as a question about the regime but rather as a question about human
rights. Thus, it is not surprising for a Zaman  journalist to write: “There is not a
restriction on the clothing of people who are visiting graves. Furthermore it is a
tradition in all religions for people to cover themselves when they are visiting a
grave.”43 As seen the emphasis on Anıtkabir is made through a visit to the dead and
as a visit to the grave of Atatürk, and Anıtkabir is not seen as a public sphere whose
rules are prescribed by certain rules but as belonging to the nation.
The fourth of the interactions of the headscarf question within the context of
the Republic Day holiday is the 2003 reception crisis which is the latest development
that has happened in the coincidences between the ‘headscarf question’ and the
Republic Day holiday. This tension was introduced when Ahmet Necdet Sezer
behaved differently from previous years, in the invitations sent for the Republic Day
holiday reception. The invitations were sent separately with a clause ‘with spouse’ or
‘without spouse’ to the invited deputies and judicial members. The reason for the
invitations to be made separately derived from the same need for precaution that led
to the contemporary clothing obligation being issued for the official ceremonies held
in Anıtkabir in 1999.
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The ‘Reception Crisis’ held a center stage for two weeks and the discussion
was tied to the discussion of the ‘public sphere’ which has actually never been absent
from the ‘headscarf question’. Thus, when examined in a wider perspective, the
‘Reception Crisis’ has different dimensions. First of all, the crisis reflects once again
the traditional tension between state elites and political elites. In the previous
chapter, it has been explained the ways in which the state elites in the construction of
Turkish nationalism have perceived the periphery as the ‘silent other’ that ought to
be educated by these state elites. However, with the passage to multi-party
democracy it has become evident that these peripheral portions of the society were
able to voice their existence. Therefore, the transformation to multi-party democracy
carried with itself a tension between state elites and political elites. (Heper, 1985)
This tension can also be seen form the Reception Crisis on 2003.  That is, whilst the
AKP government resembled the political elite of Turkish political life, President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer was argued to be representing the state elite. His words, “There
has been a tendency to position against the state’s secular character, I wanted to
prevent it”44, show that members of the state elite still carry out their duty to protect
the characteristics of the republican regime, or at least they feel that they have to
protect it. Second, whilst the ‘headscarf’ question was previously discussed
concerning the problem of university education, and whether or not female students
who wear a headscarf can attend classes, with the AKP government, we see the shift
of the discussions regarding the headscarf to the question of the protocol.
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In all these four occasions it can be seen that the headscarf question is always
tied to a question about the public sphere. More importantly, the Republic Day
holiday involves this public sphere within its domain of activities, causing itself to be
considered as a public sphere. The question of the public sphere can be seen as one
of the fault-lines of the Kemalist construction of citizenship, which is in close
relation to the role bestowed upon women, as has been explained in the second
chapter.
What the ‘headscarfed’ women confront in the names of citizenship is thus a
serious demand from the private domain which is seen as the site of particularity and
difference. In the Reception Crisis the visibility of the headscarfed women in the
reception, which is seen as the ‘summit of the state’ by the state elites, questions the
notion of citizenship upon which the conceptualization of Turkish secular citizen has
been constructed. Actually, the headscarfed women want to be visible in the public
sphere, without leaving their religious identities in the private sphere; they want to be
recognized publicly and even demand some group-differentiated rights in the name
of their differences from the rest of the society. However, this demand, though is a
democratic right in theory, challenges openly the secular character of the Turkish
Republic. And this challenge presented by headscarfed women’s requests to be
visible in the public sphere, can also be seen in the occurrences that has been
explained in four categories above. All these reflections of the headscarf question on
the Republic Day holiday show that the Republic Day holiday is seen as public
sphere, within which rights of visibility and entrance can be discussed. Thus, while
the Republic Day holiday and the associated public spheres of it, such as Anıtkabir
and the presidency are conceived as a site where ‘headscarfed women’ ought not to
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enter according to the Kemalist nationalistic discourse, the Islamist circle certainly
opposes this view. This difference in the understanding of the public sphere has been
very much evident in the discussions that have led to the Reception Crisis. Especially
the difference in the invitations sent to the people invited to the reception led to
accusations of discrimination, such as “It is wrong to differentiate the deputies, the
judges and people working in media as ‘those whose spouse is covered’ and ‘those
whose spouse is not covered’45 and “Sezer has made an unseen discrimination
against headscarfed women”46. Conversely, the Kemalist circle represented by
Cumhuriyet in this study, approached this crisis with an emphasis that Sezer had
done the right thing to prevent headscarfed women’s visibility in a state reception.
Thus, the four instances where the question of headscarf have occurred in the
context of the Republic Day holiday, all address the public-private distinction that
the Kemalist project of nationalism constructed in the early Republican period, as
explained in the second chapter. These instances also support the argument of this
thesis, since the Headscarf question which touches upon the Republic Day holiday
reveals that the Republic Day holiday is an embodiment of national identity, and in
this site negotiations and interventions continue.
In the next subsection, the focus is still on revealing the specific interventions
that have occurred in the post-1997 period concerning the Republic Day holiday, but
the emphasis will now be on the rhetoric of ‘the people’ that has been incorporated
into the discourse of the Republic Day holiday in this period.
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46 Korkmaz, Tamer. Zaman,  31 October 2003.
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4.3.3 “The People” in the Holiday : “The People” of the Nation
In the analysis of the newspapers about the representation and experience of
Republic Day holidays in the post-1997 period, there has been another field of
discussion of such centrality that without mentioning this discussion this study would
not be complete. The rhetoric of the distinction between state and society, with an
emphasis on civil society can be observed in the celebrative activities arranged
around the Republic Day Holidays in the period of this study. That is, the
participation of people has been represented by some as being done on their own
account, while others perceived this participation as something obligatory. This
difference in the views was affected by the secularists and Islamist elites having
differing perceptions of the regime, of the celebration of the regime via the Republic
Day holiday and towards each other. In fact a high number of civil society
organizations participated in the celebrations of the Republic Day holidays in this
period without direct intervention by a state official. Examples of civil society
organizations that have participated in the celebration include: Atatürkist Thought
Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği), Association of Republican Women
(Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği), Association for Supporting Modern Life (Çağdaş
Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği) , Universities, and Sports Associations. At the first
sight, this increase in the number of civil society organizations participating in
celebrations of the Republic Day holiday, entail an opening and widening of the
democratic sphere of the Turkish political scene.
However, Yashin (1998: 7-8) views this proliferation of the civil society
organizations not as an expression of a better democratic environment in the public
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sphere, but as an outcome of the statecraft to incorporate the rhetoric of civil society
into its discourse.  More clearly, she argues that both Islamist and secular bureaucrats
utilized a productive discourse of the notion of ‘civil society’, and she points out the
ways in which the discourse of ‘state versus society’ was appropriated in different
and culturally specific ways by both Islamist and secularist bureaucrats throughout
the 1980s and 1990s.
This appropriation of the notion of ‘civil society’ in the rhetoric of the
bureaucrats can take diverse forms, but in all forms the presence of ‘civil society’  in
the political arena is interpreted by the bureaucrats as support given to the cause by
the specific political group. In the celebrations of the Republic Day holidays, the
appropriation of the rhetoric of civil society can be observed as well. Yashin also
points out that the 75th year celebrations of the Republic Day holiday can be analyzed
along the theoretical framework that she has developed to understand the `state-
society dichotomy` that has dominated the political arena of Turkey in the 80s and
90s. By the `state-society dichotomy` she refers to a common argument about
Turkish political life in this period, that there have been undeterminable democratic
openings in the public sphere, in which divergent groups have began to demand
various rights. Yashin (1998:20) questions the emphasis given to the notion of ‘civil
society’ in the studies of this period, and argues that ‘civil-society’ is context-bound
and contingent. In the aim to observe Yashin’s (1998:21) argument about the 80s and
90s in Turkey, in which she claims that in this period `civil society` was transformed
into a symbolic ground on which legitimate state power was going to be based, this
study will explore the reflections of this discussion within the context of Republic
Day holidays in the post-1997 period.
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Throughout the various readings of the data, it has been observed that the
society versus state rhetoric alongside the notion of ‘people’ has been incorporated
into the representation of Republic Day holidays in various forms. However, among
the years of this study, 1998 is peculiar since the rhetoric of ‘the people’ and ‘civil
society’ have been more evident on this year. Now, these findings will be presented.
As has been pointed out before, 1998 is significant since it is the aftermath of the 28th
February process and is simultaneously the 75th year of the Republic. Yashin argues
that the secularist bureaucrats became aware of the power of incorporating the notion
of ‘people’ and ‘civil society’ into their discourse since they had seen this as a reason
for the rise of Islamism in this period. The importance given to ‘the people’ by the
Islamist bureaucrats, has been noticed by the secularist bureaucrats and thus they
have become more interested in ‘the people’. More specifically, the objective of the
secularist bureaucrats in this period was to present the regime, not as an imposition
from above, but as being endorsed by ‘the people’; that is, the regime was not a
burden on the people of the state but was rather about the will of the people. (Yashin,
1998: 7)  For this objective, the Republic Day holidays provided a ground since a
shift in the way of celebration could be used as a powerful symbol of a shift in
official nationalism. This shift can be summarized as the shift from the holiday-that-
is watched and the holiday-that-is-participated in.  On the one hand, the degree of the
ability of the given celebrative activity to incorporate ‘the people’ into itself  became
a notion that gained importance in this period, on the other hand, who celebrated the
activity more extensively and more enthusiastically became also a part of the
discussion and experience of the Republic Day holiday.
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 The concerts held by two municipalities in Ankara in 1997 are an example of
the question of who celebrated the holiday more enthusiastically. There were two
‘alternative’ concerts on the 1997 Republic Day holiday: one was held by the
Çankaya Municipality in Kızılay Square, and the other was held by the Greatest
Ankara Municipality in Sihhiye Square. These two concerts were presented in the
media as competing concerts for celebrating the Republic Day holiday. A columnist
of the Hürriyet newspaper, wrote as a joke that “this year the capital city has
experienced an unseen race for celebrate the Republic Day holiday, in which parties
were near to fighting to celebrating the Republic Day holiday better than the other
party”, and argues that the enthusiasm on the side of the Welfare Party Mayor, Melih
Gökçek arises from the 28th February process.47  As has been outlined in the second
chapter, 1997 has been chosen for the beginning of this study since it was believed
that this period would include some changes in how the Republic Day Holiday was
perceived and presented in the Turkish political scene. As has been mentioned
before, the 28th February process brought a change in the Islamist circles` perception
of politics and state-society relations. They have tried to adapt themselves to the 28th
February process conditions by de-Islamizing their discourse, emphasizing a
discourse that avoided any societal tensions, and taking a low-profile,
nonconfrontational and moderate stance. (Cizre and Çınar, 2003:323)   In the light of
this strategy, their enthusiasm about the Republic Day holiday can be read as part of
their attempt to protect themselves from further conditions of instability by a
consensus-seeking strategy.  Although, this strategy was not only confined to their
participation in the Republic Day holidays, the ‘holiday’ was certainly a more visible
tool to express their desire to be included in the national imaginary.  This event is a
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137
clear example of how the Republic Day holiday resembled the embodiment of the
national imaginary, a pie that different groups want their share from it, by organizing
concerts and various activities. But these concerts and activities have the objective of
making people to participate in these activities by their own will; that is, not by an
imposition from a state official. Thus, in the 1997 event of municipalities organizing
alternative concerts in Ankara, ‘the people’ were presented as voluntarily engaging
in all of the concerts. However it should not be forgotten that these concerts were
arranged free for people to show themselves in the activities in relation to the
Republic Day holiday. Thus, it is not easy to tell whether or not people were in the
square for the concert or for the cause of the Republic Day holiday.
This emphasis on the voluntary participation of the ‘people’ in the
celebrations can also be observed in the 1998 Republic Day Holiday, which featured
headings such as “people and military together”, “the people claimed the Republic”,
“Hundred thousands ran to their Ata” .48 This year was significant, since it was both
the 75th anniversary of the Republic and was at the same time the aftermath of the
28th February process. Consequently, in the newspapers, there had been an
extraordinary amount of space reserved for reporting the Republic Day holiday,
either through the presentation of information about the various activities held or
through various stories told by the columnists about the significance and importance
of the Republic Day holiday. In all these writings of the columnists, there was a
significant emphasis on how the ‘people’ were participating in the Republic Day
holidays by their own will. Though it can neither be argued that the people were
made to participate in the Republic Day holidays by force nor that they were
                                                
48 ‘Ata’ is the abbreviation for Atatürk which literally means ancestor.
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participating fully by their own will, still it is worth stressing that the nature of the
participation of the ‘people’ in the Republic Day Holiday was an issue.
In 2003 the state versus society discourse can also be observed from the
newspapers. In this year the newspapers presented the reception crisis as part of the
`state`, whilst the celebrations were shown as being part of the `society`. The
expressions in the newspapers shared a common understanding of the intersection of
the state versus society dichotomy with the Republic Day holiday, arguing that the
‘state’ was not able to solve the problems that have occurred because of the
‘headscarf’ question, but ‘people’ were celebrating their holiday peacefully.49 Here,
the emphasis was made on ‘the people’ as being free from problems such as the
conflicts of the state bureaucrats.
Here there is another point that ought to be emphasized: that is, while the
bureaucrats have been incorporating the notion of ‘civil society’ into their discourses,
at the same time in line with the linkage between the holiday and the regime, the
Republic Day holiday and the participation in it has been symbolized as an indicator
of the change of the relations between state and society in Turkey. In the third
chapter, the distance between state and society which has been constructed by the
Kemalist nationalist project has been explained. This distance has led to certain
problems in the post-1980 period. The return to ‘the people’ by the rhetoric of the
Republic day holidays was in some cases presented as an obvious sign of people
claiming the Republic. That is, whilst the state was not as efficient as it should be in
employing the Kemalist nationalist project, ‘the people’ were fond of their Republic,
                                                
49 Hürriyet and Zaman,30 October 2003
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and they show their attachment by participating in the Republic day holidays
voluntarily.   Thus, this increasing participation or the increase in the emphasis made
on voluntary participation is presented as a solution to many problems that have
occurred in Turkey.
Moreover, participation in the Republic Day holidays, neglecting any attempt to
incorporate the organizations of civil society in these celebrative activities, has been
symbolized as the degree to which the given group is within or without the definition
of national identity. With such interpretation, the Republic Day holiday becomes
once again an embodiment of national identity, such that any group which desires to
be accepted as a legitimate group in political and social fields has attempted to
present itself in the celebrations of the Republic Day holiday. This point about the
Republic Day holiday, would add another layer to the argument of this thesis. While,
using Yashin’s argument, it has been argued that the Republic Day holiday has been
pulled by secularist and Islamist bureaucrats from different ends in order to suit their
purposes; these were not the only parties that seek legitimacy on the ground provided
by the Republic Day holiday. There were other social groups which utilized the
republic day holiday to infer on the legitimizing ground that the national imaginary
presented. Among the other social groups, this study will examine the instances
where the Kurdish problem has found a place in the context of the Republic Day
holiday.
This thesis argues that the embodiment of ‘Turkish national identity’ in the
Republic Day holiday can be better observed when news addressing
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HADEP-DEHAP or PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party)50 is analyzed. Through this
analysis, it is seen that whilst news about PKK was given as a success in the context
of the Republic Day holiday, news about the HADEP-DEHAP was given as a
controlled attempt on behalf of the party leaders to show themselves via their
participation in the Republic Day holiday. For example, in 1998 there was a terrorist
attack by a PKK terrorist by hijacking an airplane. The reason for choosing the
Republic Day holiday for this hijacking is obvious, since a terrorist attack on the
Republic Day holiday means an attack to the Republic which is embodied in and
through the Republic Day holiday. Another news event concerning terrorists
occurred in 1999 when a group of 8 terrorists surrendered to the state and it is written
such that this surrender had been purposefully designed to be on 29 October.51  On
1999, there is another interesting news article concerning the holiday message of
Abdullah Öcalan.52 His message celebrating the Republic indicates the importance of
the Republic Day holiday as a symbol of the ‘nation’, and it is interesting to note that
he celebrates not the Republic Day holiday but the “democratic republic”.
Another news event that has been noticed in the context of the Kurdish
problem is the account arguing that DEHAP has begun an “attempt to make peace
with the Republic” by participating in the 80th year celebration in all platforms.53 In
this attempt the argument of this thesis is once again supported since the party
leaders utilize the symbolic power of the Republic Day Holiday in their attempt to
                                                
50 Throughout the 1990’s, the Kurdish problem attained a different face in Turkey. The PKK, a maoist
terrorist movement that claimed to speak for the Kurds was efficient in the southeast region, and the
minor war between PKK and the Turkish Army Forces was continuing up until Öcalan was caught in
mid-february 1999. Halkın Demokrasi Partisi -HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was the initial
party that was considered as the party associated with the Kurdish problem, and after its closure it was
replaced by Demokratik Halk Partisi- DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party).
51 Zaman,  30 October 1999.
52 Cumhuriyet, 30 October 1999.
53 Zaman , 29 October 2003.
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develop a different attitude in their relation to the regime. The example of HADEP/
DEHAP making peace with the Republic by participating in the Republic Day
holiday celebrations, and the holiday message of Abdullah Öcalan reveal how the
Republic Day holiday is used as a platform of negotiation.
In all these examples, the state versus society discourse is obvious in the
celebrations of the Republic Day holiday. In line with Yashin’s argument about the
incorporation of the rhetoric of civil society into the discourse of statecraft, in the
case of the Republic Day holiday the holiday has been a point of competition and of
belonging to the ‘people’. The point argued in this subsection is that different circles
claim ownership of the Republic Day holiday, and that their claim of being the
representative of the ‘people’ that participated in the holiday is a result of the
perception of the Republic Day holiday as an embodiment of the national imaginary.
That is, the holiday is constructed as symbol, as a point of the embodiment of the
national imaginary, such that presence and participation in the holiday becomes a
sign of the degree of belongingness to the national imaginary and an attempt to be
accepted as part of the national imaginary. The holiday is a site which is constitutive
of the ‘nation’, but it is not a steady point, it is a point of transgression, a point that
can be pulled in different directions. This shift of the site of ‘holiday’ attains a
meaning since it is at the same time a shift of the boundaries of the national
imaginary; that is a redrawing of the boundaries of the national imagination.
Different circles attach different meanings to the holiday, but this differentiation of
meanings does not deprive the holiday from its importance; on the contrary it
increases its importance. By redefining the holiday and its associated activities, the
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holiday can be argued as a point where the national imaginary shows itself by
simultaneously constructing itself.
In the previous two sections, the emphasis has been on the ambiguous nature of
the Republic Day holiday, ambiguous not in the sense that is deprived of meaning,
but ambiguous as being open to modification, reconstruction and reconstitution. This
openness derives from the Republic Day holiday’s being seen and presented as the
embodiment of the ‘nation’ and the best indicator of the national imaginary, such that
negotiations have even been made about how to celebrate it. Not only has the
Republic Day holiday been a point of contestation between secularist and Islamist
bureaucrats, but it has also been a point where different circles redefine their position
and place within the national imaginary.
To sum up, in this chapter the themes significant in the Republic Day holiday in
the post-1997 period have been analyzed. In the first section, it has been argued that
different newspapers: Zaman  Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet,  present the Republic Day
holiday in different manners by implying one theme over another since they are
different in the way they frame national imaginary. In the second section, the themes
which seem ordinary in representing the Republic Day holiday are argued to be
significant on reconstructing national imaginary and implying togetherness. In the
third section, the emphasis has been made on the ways in which the republic Day
holiday can serve as point of contestation, negotiation and intervention.
With this analysis, this thesis states two interrelated conclusive points. First the
Republic Day holiday is suggested to be taken as a dynamic point in which national
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imaginary is embodied onto, therefore different nationalistic discourses develop
different ways of both celebrating and representing the Republic Day holiday.
Second, the Republic Day holiday is both a point that national imaginary is
embodied onto and thus is inclusive for the imaginary terrain of the nation. However
at the same time, the Republic Day holiday is a site where negotiations, interventions
and contestations about the definition of the “nation” and “national identity”
continue. These two points will be elaborated more on the preceding chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored the Republic day holiday celebrations and its
representations in three newspapers; Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet in the post-
1997 period Turkey. Assuming that there is an inherent link between this
commemorative activity and the national imaginary, this study has been carried out
to reveal the various ways by which this link has been actualized.
This exploration has been carried out on three grounds. First the differences
in the ways Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet have represented the Republic Day
holidays have been explained. Here, it has been argued that the differences in the
representation of Republic Day holidays by these three newspapers are an indicator
of the different nationalistic discourses that these newspapers belong to. Second, the
ordinary features of the nationalist imaginary which can be traced in the
representation of Republic day holidays are explained. Here the role that the
Republic Day holiday has played in the sustaining of the national imaginary, by
providing temporal and spatial reference points have been emphasized. Third, the
Republic day holiday has been approached from a more specific perspective in order
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to reveal the reflections of the post-1997 political conjuncture in Turkey in those
celebrations.
In all of these three grounds the Republic Day holiday has been taken as
point, a platform, and a site which represents and reflects Turkish national imaginary.
That is, not only the changes of the issues in the national imaginary can be found in
the celebrations and representations of Republic Day holidays, but also groups that
wish to be included in or attempt to change the terms of their integration to the
national imaginary express their presence via their presence in the Republic Day
holiday.
As an ideological field, the field of nationalism is made up of non-tied
elements whose identity is ‘open’,  nationalistic discourses intervene onto this ‘open’
sphere in order to attach meaning to the various happenings and elements in this
field. This thesis argues that, the Republic Day holiday has been one of the many
ways nationalistic discourses has intervened to constitute the national imaginary in
the post-1997 period in Turkey. Previously celebrated as a holiday-of-the-state, with
the rise of nationalistic discourses, the scope by which Republic Day holiday has
been conceptualized, changed. The extent to which the transformation of the
Republic Day holiday from a holiday-that-is-watched to a holiday-that-is participated
has been real, is a matter of question, however it is certain that the so-called
transformation has led to a divergence in the ways in which the national self
participated in these celebrations in the post-1997 period. Thus, Republic Day
holiday occurred as a point which has been self-referential and reflective in its
relation to the national imaginary.  That is, it has been a point where reflections of
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the ‘nation’ can be seen, since it is argued to be a platform where national
imagination is embodied onto; and simultaneously a point on which interventions
and contestations continue, since the attitude that a certain group has developed in its
relation with the Republic Day holiday referred to the attitude that it developed in
relation to the national imaginary. In other words, the Republic Day holiday implied
divergence as well as it implied harmony.
This thesis states that not in instances where the Republic Day holiday has
been presented as straightforwardly being celebrated by ‘all the nation’, but more in
instances where disagreement on and negotiation  towards the way to celebrate the
Republic Day holiday has been various, the main function of the Republic Day
holiday in the nationalist ideology is realized. This means that presenting the ‘nation-
as-one’ as participating in the celebrations without any questioning is to a large
extent an illusion. Whereas when there are differences in the way to celebrate the
Republic Day holiday among different groups, this situation represents the reality.
But the argument made here is not a reality versus illusion comparison. To explain
better, when there are differences in the way of approaching the Republic Day
holiday, this means that the various groups voice their statements in the imaginary
terrain of the ‘nation’ which is represented by the Republic Day holiday. This does
not only sustain that the Republic Day holiday is ‘of the nation’, but that these
various groups are ‘of the same nation’ even if their priorities are different. This is so
because all groups express their positive or negative attitudes via the Republic Day
holiday, thus all are referring to the same national imaginary.
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In our analysis; there were cases where the harmonizing function of the
Republic Day holiday have been more obvious or instances where there have been
intense debates occurring around the site of the Republic Day holiday. The
conclusive argument of this thesis is that; whether with harmony or with antagonism,
whether by a group whose place in the national imaginary is strong or by a group
which desires to be legitimately included in the national imaginary, in each
circumstance the interventions to the Republic  Day holiday by itself implies a series
of significations.  All interventions, negotiations and contestations occurring in the
site of the Republic day holiday signify the ‘nation’ and ‘national imaginary’ as a
legitimate referent.54
Thus, even if there are differences in the way ‘nation’ and ‘national
imaginary’ is perceived by different nationalistic groups, since all these groups
express their difference via the Republic Day holiday, contrary to what it seems to
be, they even sustain and strengthen the national imaginary. Though there are
seemingly opposite webs of meanings attached to the ‘national imaginary’, this
divergence does not conceal the fact that there is a ‘nation’ whose imaginary
boundaries are constantly renegotiated to be redrawn. Thus, the Republic Day
holiday has two overlapping but seemingly contradictory functions which serve to
the continuation of the ‘national imaginary’. It serves as a point where differences in
the ‘national imaginary’ can be expressed, and simultaneously it serves as a limit to
the expression of differences. This second point is mostly disregarded in the
                                                
54 It should be noted that, the conclusive argument of this thesis is constrained with the newspapers
explored in this study. Since Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet are newspapers which are close to the
center, their approach to the Republic Day holiday are different from newspapers whose ideological
positions are extreme. For example, if this study had chosen Akit as the representative of the Islamist
circle, than the conclusion of this thesis would have been different.
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interpretations of the meaning of a commemorative activity in the ‘national
imaginary’.
Therefore, this thesis argues that the differences in nationalistic discourses do
not entail a lessening in the importance of nationalistic belonging and ‘national
imaginary’. On the contrary, the differences between nationalistic discourses and
various groups in their approach to the Republic Day holiday, might reveal dissimilar
priorities in the imagination of a ‘nation’, but still it sustains that all these
nationalistic discourses and various groups imagine themselves within the same
‘nation’, since they all voice their position via the Republic Day holiday which is ‘of
the nation’. Therefore, the Republic day holiday should be treated as an embodiment
of the ‘nation’, whereas contested interventions on this site are inherently continuous.
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